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Review Article

Theoretical and Behavioristic Interpretation of Psychoanalysis" (commentary on David Rapaport's book "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory)

VM Rozin*

Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

***Corresponding Author:** VM Rozin, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.

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Abstract

The article presents the main ideas of the book by the famous psychologist David Rapaport, which has not been published in Russia, and the author's comments on them. In this work, Rapaport acts simultaneously in three roles: as a psychoanalytic theorist, a historian of psychoanalysis, and a methodologist. Following Sigmund Freud, he considers psychoanalytic theory as a natural science, but, as the author shows, very inconsistently. Although Rapaport puts forward the implementation of the principles of mathematization, comprehensive determinism, and empirical verification as necessary conditions for constructing such a theory, he demonstrates that putting them into practice is very difficult, if not impossible. The behavioristic interpretation of psychoanalysis also encounters difficulties. Here, Freud's division of mental processes into primary and secondary processes is an obstacle. While the former (drive/desire → satisfaction of desire) can still be interpreted closely to the behaviorist "stimulus → reaction" scheme, the latter (drive/desire → mediation → satisfaction of desire) have nothing in common with this scheme. The fact is that mediation, according to Freud, represents a search for the object of the drive and adherence to the reality principle, which presuppose the work of thinking, cognition, and personality; the latter are practically impossible to conceive within the logic of behaviorism. The author compares Rapaport's work on constructing the theory of psychoanalysis with Freud's understanding of theory, showing that these psychologists had different ideas about theory. Freud understood theory more as a set of concepts that serve practice; furthermore, these concepts were based on "psychotechnical schemes". The latter defined the reality of the psyche as Freud understood it and made it possible to help patients, but they had nothing in common with natural scientific theory. In the final part of the article, the author outlines the structure of Freud's discourse, which Rapaport partly follows. Working with the schematic constructions of the primary and secondary processes, Freud unfolds them into narratives and builds complex humanitarian and philosophical reasoning, obtaining new distinctions, which he then condenses into new theoretical constructions.

Keywords: *Psychoanalysis; Theory; Methodology; Reality; Psyche; Consciousness; Unconscious; Thinking; Practice; Resistance*

Introduction

Although this book was published back in 1960, it has not been translated in Russia. Merton M. Gill and George S. Klein write in the foreword that "although David Rapaport (1911-1960) died at the early age of 49, he left an indelible legacy in the fields of psychoanalysis and psychology" [1, p. 2]. Indeed, the book proposed for analysis is very interesting, both in terms of presenting one version of psychoanalytic theory and for the inadvertently provided opportunity to discuss the methodology of constructing a complex psychological theory. This is because Rapaport in this book acts simultaneously as a psychologist-psychoanalyst and as a methodologist.

I will begin by clarifying the title: in what sense is it a "theoretical and behavioristic interpretation"? Apparently, Rapaport is a firm follower of Freud regarding the natural scientific, even partly physicalist, approach to constructing psychology. This is indicated, among other things, by his commitment to "comprehensive determinism" and the demand for the mathematization of psychoanalysis. "The influence of Helmholtz on Freud's theory", writes Rapaport, "is manifested in the postulate of comprehensive determinism, the 'pleasure-pain' principle (primary process) based on the concept of entropy, the reality principle (secondary process) based on the concept of least action, and the 'economic principle' based on the principle of conservation" [ibid., p. 11]. "Freud did not say that quantitative assessments could not be in the theory, but neither he nor anyone else among psychoanalysts attempted to quantify the variables in psychoanalytic theory. However useful the theory may be in clinical practice, however much light it sheds on a wide range of phenomena, however much it is confirmed by clinical experience, it still requires, for its scientific verification, clear tests with a mathematical relationship between them" [ibid., p. 37] (The text here and below is given in the translation by Nikolai Petyaev).

Tyson F. and Tyson R. provide this explanation of primary and secondary processes in their book: "Freud indicated that the primary process is the language of the Unconscious, which functions according to the pleasure principle. This idea corresponded to his model of drive discharge and the theory that the goal of the mental apparatus is to maintain homeostasis. Freud described the primary process as facilitating the satisfaction of a drive by distorting and masking contradictory derivatives of that drive. After this, the drive energy can be discharged, and pleasure can then be obtained, because, although the drive impulses reach consciousness, they do so only in a masked form... Throughout the child's life, many disappointments await. Not receiving the expected satisfaction, the child engages in forming a concept of the real world, seeks ways to influence the circumstances of this real world. Thus, the reality principle is established. And with the establishment of this principle, restrained actions are carried out with the help of thinking as a 'by-product' of delayed satisfaction. Freud emphasized that the crucial difference between the primary and secondary processes is the connection of visual images with words: 'Thinking in images is, therefore, a very incomplete form of becoming conscious'. By connecting visual images with corresponding words, the individual achieves a high level of psychic organization, which enables the primary processes to achieve their aim through the secondary process" [2].

The mathematization of psychoanalysis seems extremely difficult to Rapaport because, firstly, the cathexis of the drive (intensity of desires) and libido as intrapsychic phenomena cannot be measured; secondly, there are many pathways of causal influences in the psyche that are difficult to identify; thirdly, there is a large distance between the main variables of the theory and the observed phenomena, which also hinders measurements [1, p. 37-38]. Rapaport sees the solution in constructing a good theory. "This", he notes, "shows the necessity of constructing a theory, because only a 'well-knit' theory, with clear definitions and implicative rules, can pass tests in which the observed phenomena are far from the theory" [ibid., p. 36].

Here, however, a natural question arises: if mathematization is practically impossible, what kind of theory will this be, and can it then be classified as natural scientific psychology? We receive no answer, and Rapaport has many such compromises - necessary, but... For example, although the concept of the primary process provides one of the foundations of psychoanalytic theory, Rapaport writes that "the drive is defined as a causal agent, inherent in the organism, and by virtue of this capable of generating 'spontaneous' behavior... this definition makes the effectiveness of the drive dependent on an environmental factor - the presence of the drive object, triggering one or another drive... eventually, types of behavior were discovered in which determination by drives was absent. Thus emerged the concept of the autonomy of the ego" [ibid., p. 48].

The desire to turn psychoanalysis into a rigorous theory seems natural. But there are theories and theories. Freud understood theory more as a set of concepts that serve practice. Furthermore, I show that these concepts were based on "psychotechnical schemes"; the latter defined the reality of the psyche as Freud understood it and made it possible to help patients, but they had nothing in common with natural scientific theory [3, p. 168, 172]. And many other psychological theories are oriented towards practice and based on schemes. But

Rapaport is not satisfied with such a theory; in this respect, he resembles L.S. Vygotsky, who in his programmatic article of 1927, "The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology", writes that psychology should be constructed as a natural, experimental science, "using data from physiology" and oriented towards serving psychotechnics and "the artificial control of behavior" [4, p. 389, 390].

However, in reality, Vygotsky constructs psychology not as a natural scientific theory, but as a hybrid discipline, which methodologically contains many schemes and much from humanitarian thinking (but also from natural scientific thinking) [5, p. 111-124]. I would venture to say that this is generally characteristic of several well-known psychologists: they declare one thing, but act based on other considerations. For example, C. Jung writes that he "strives to create in psychology a universal energetic theory, such as exists in the natural sciences" [6, p. 160]. But here is an example of how he actually operates. Among the archetypes of his theory is the "Anima". Jung tells how he arrived at this concept. "First, in his dreams-visions-fantasies, the image of a beautiful blind girl appears, who is in the company of the prophet Elijah and a huge black snake. Then the image of the girl is displaced by a female voice, in which Jung recognizes one of his patients. This voice actively debates with Jung, asserting, for example, that his interpretation is art or that Jung, as an artist, himself creates the content of unconscious experiences... I thought", Jung recalls, "that this 'woman within me' lacks her own speech centers and expresses herself through my help. She spoke with me more than once, and at length. I was extremely intrigued that some woman exists inside me and interferes with my thoughts. Indeed, I thought, perhaps she is the 'soul' in the primitive sense of the word, and I asked myself why the soul came to be called 'anima,' why it is represented as something feminine. Subsequently, I understood that this 'woman within me' is a certain typical, or archetypal, image in the unconscious of every man; I named it the 'Anima'" [ibid., p. 187; 5, p. 197].

In this case, Jung's interpretation of his dream is a scheme (it resolves Jung's problematic situation, defines a new reality - the "Anima" as an archetype - allows for a new interpretation of dreams and other unconscious manifestations of the psyche; on the functions of schemes); see our book "Introduction to Schematology: Schemes in Philosophy, Culture, Science, Design" [7, p. 45-70]. Jung's theory is completely unlike a natural scientific theory; it resembles more a humanitarian science, allowing for the interpretation of various narrative texts (for Jung, these are mainly dreams and patient narratives/reports). And Rapaport's theory of psychoanalysis is closer to humanitarian constructions. Now, why do I assert that this theory represents a behavioristic interpretation?

Because, according to Rapaport, psychoanalysis is the study of behavior; furthermore, he proposes as the main theoretical construct a scheme resembling the behaviorist "stimulus → reaction", only the stimulus is interpreted as a drive/desire, and the satisfaction of desires is substituted for the reaction. "The subject matter of psychoanalysis", writes Rapaport, "is behavior. This assumption has often been ignored, perhaps because the theory's emphasis on unconscious processes and drives, psychological structures, dynamics, and economics masked the fact that the theory uses all these concepts to explain behavior. Behavior in this theory is broadly defined, including overt behavior, feelings, 'normal' and 'pathological,' frequent and rare, unique. This conclusion has also often been missed, perhaps because of the theory's emphasis on its starting points - hidden, latent behavior and pathologies. The principle of comprehensive psychological determinism of all behavior has been a cornerstone of the theory since Freud, who clearly formulated it as early as 1904, but it was only Hartmann in 1939 who stated [Hartmann, 1939a] that psychoanalysis is a general psychology, encompassing the study of both normal and pathological behavior" [1, p. 39].

"The primary cognitive (ideational) model was formulated by Freud in 1900: drive/desire reaches an intensity threshold - absence of the drive/desire object - hallucinatory idea of past satisfaction" [ibid., p. 25]. Speaking of the drive object, Rapaport complicates the behaviorist model by introducing mediation into it. Not finding the object of the drive or, as Freud later argued, coming into conflict with the reality principle, the desire is inhibited and seeks other ways of realization (ranging from dreams to illness and creativity).

Merton and Klein doubt that Rapaport understands drive/desire in behaviorist terms. "Rapaport", they write, "insisted that in psychoanalytic theory 'instinctual drive' is a psychological concept that cannot be equated with either peripheral somatic or neurophysiological concepts of drives in behaviorist theories. He argued that a self-sufficient psychology can and should develop in its

own terms" [ibid., p. 6-7]. However, the content of Rapaport's statements in the book still suggests that, in terms of understanding the psyche, he was very close to behaviorism.

Rapaport's behaviorist inclinations are also evident in the assertion that psychoanalysis is essentially a psychological theory of learning. As is known, behaviorists considered the application of their theory most effective precisely in the field of learning. "Perhaps even more important", write Merton and Klein, "than any of these contributions is that in all his work Rapaport emphasized and developed Freud's concept of structure in psychological functioning. Rapaport defined structures as processes of slow change, in contrast to motives, which are processes of rapid change. He believed that the much-needed psychoanalytic theory of learning would be concerned with the creation and maintenance of structures, and that this theory could be based on Freud's hypotheses about the functioning of attention cathexes... The problem of learning", Rapaport himself concludes, "namely, how a process turns into a structure, or the problem of long-term retention and accessibility of experience, has not yet been solved in psychoanalysis" [ibid., p. 4, 34-35].

The concept of the drive object and the reality principle raise the question of the extent to which Rapaport succeeded in his theory in implementing the principle of determinism and providing a behaviorist interpretation. The fact is that the subject's finding (if present) of the drive object and discerning what corresponds to reality and what does not presuppose structures and the action of thinking, cognition, and personality, which are very difficult to interpret deterministically and behavioristically. Rapaport partly understands this but turns a blind eye to this difficulty, dismissing it with assertions about the complexity and hierarchy of mental processes and variables. Reflecting on how to overcome this difficulty, he proposes distinguishing between "overdetermination", "multiple determination", and "multiplicity of levels of analysis". Furthermore, he writes that "one must reluctantly admit that in psychoanalysis, statistical probabilities may exist instead of laws. This is better than asserting that laws exist but not being able to describe their implicative rules" [ibid., p. 41].

It is worth noting that for Freud such a problem did not exist; when introducing the distinction between primary and secondary processes, he thinks not so much as a theorist but as a philosopher. "The primary process", Rapaport follows Freud and explains, "works with the energy of drives, and its regulatory principle is tension reduction (the pleasure principle). The primary process seeks the immediate release of accumulated energy, by a direct path, through the mechanisms of repression, condensation, symbolization, and substitute formation. The secondary process operates according to the principle of least action and is oriented towards objective reality. It seeks, through delays and all sorts of detours, a safe path to the desired object in reality, 'freezing' the discharge of drive energy until the object is found [Freud, 1900]. In the course of development, hierarchical structures of defense and control emerge, acting as 'dams'... This property of reducing the tendency of drives towards immediate discharge is called 'neutralization,' special cases of which are called de-libidination, de-aggressivization, and sublimation [8, Kris, 1950, Hartmann, 1955, ibid., p. 51].

And here is why this problem (the theoretical interpretation of secondary processes) does not exist for Freud. His theory, as already noted, was based on psychotechnical schemes, and schemes are created by the researcher individually, independently of each other (or connected only through content). Therefore, in Freud's conception, phenomena interpreted physicalistically (force, libidinal energy, resistance, etc.) coexist without problem on equal footing with phenomena understood in a broader sense, for example, epistemologically or philosophically, such as consciousness, the unconscious, the ego, etc.

In addition to mathematization and the principle of determinism (equivalent to the laws of first nature), the natural scientific approach presupposes one more condition, namely experiment (its model, as is known, was proposed by Galileo). In psychology, this condition is discussed as validation. Rapaport agrees that for Freud, the verification of theory was associated not with experiment but with practical experience. "Freud believed", he writes, "that only the primary experience of psychoanalytic treatment could provide an understanding of the essence of the method and help in the validation of psychoanalytic predictions, that psychoanalytic theory could only be confirmed by the psychoanalytic method itself" [ibid., p. 16].

Nevertheless, under the influence of the natural scientific approach, Rapaport understands validation as the confirmation of theory by empirical observations (facts) and arrives at discouraging conclusions regarding psychoanalysis. Rapaport explains this conclusion by stating that experimenters incorrectly identified facts, ignoring psychoanalytic theory.

"This interrelationship between observations and concepts", he explains, "is common to all sciences: observations demonstrate theoretical relationships only to those who already conceive of the observed in terms of the theory's concepts. But the psychologist tends to lose sight of this truism when it comes to psychoanalysis. This oversight is so widespread that the lack of systematic treatment of the theory alone cannot explain it. There must be other reasons, and some of them can be surmised: the psychologist is accustomed to explicit, operational definitions of concepts and is wary of the definitions of concepts that psychoanalysis provides. He suspects that the mutual implications of psychoanalytic concepts conceal a vicious circle. In the absence of a systematic exposition of the theory, we can sympathize with his caution, but we must bear in mind that in physics it would occur to no one to ask for an explicit definition of energy that did not include the concept of work (which, in turn, includes the concepts of path and force, which, in turn, include mass and acceleration, which, in turn, include time and velocity)...

The vast majority of experiments designed to test psychoanalytic propositions show a glaring lack of interest in the meaning of the propositions being tested within the framework of psychoanalytic theory. Thus, most of them certainly did not measure what they intended to measure; as for the rest, it is unclear whether they measured it or not... extensive experimental data for a system, which could serve as its confirmation from the standpoint of the usual criteria of psychological experiments, cannot be considered convincing from the standpoint of psychoanalytic theory, because most experiments ignore the definitions of the theory" [ibid., p. 83, 113].

For comparison, let me also cite the assessment of validation procedures by well-known psychologists L. Hjelle and D. Ziegler. They show that it is impossible to experimentally substantiate Freud's theory because its concepts are ambiguous and cannot be reproduced "in a controlled experiment". "When the results obtained are based on such vague and indefinable inferences, it is simply impossible to understand whether they are consistent with the theory". And other psychological theories, Hjelle and Ziegler believe, cannot be experimentally confirmed either [9, p. 138, 295, 506].

Let us also dwell on Rapaport's understanding of the reality principle. He draws attention to the fact that Freud introduces this principle to explain human adaptation: the operation of this principle allows for obtaining correct knowledge about the world. Moreover, while Freud partly linked it to biological structures, and less to social ones, Erikson, for example, interprets them mainly as social acquisitions. "According to the theory, the secondary process reflects reality 'truthfully,' i.e. not simply in terms of the drive whose object must be attained, but in terms of the 'actual' relations between objects existing in reality [Freud, 1900]. The secondary process does not blindly strive for drive discharge but 'adapts' to reality [Freud, 1911]. The secondary process is characterized by a delay in discharge, a shifting of attention to find a safe path, 'full' accessibility of memory and its use in experimental thinking. The secondary process is not selective in a limiting sense, like the primary process; it has broad access to reality concerning which it forms selective judgments and makes choices. This concept implied that reality is 'objective,' and secondary processes, unlike primary ones, do not 'distort' reality... This concept remained incomplete, as the origins, nature, and function of the secondary process were left unexplained...

The fifth concept of reality, foreshadowed by Freud's third concept and Hartmann's concept, is Erikson's psychological concept (1950, 1956). Man is potentially adapted from birth, not only to the average expectable environment, but to a whole changing series of environments. These environments are not 'objective' but are the social environments through which a person's maturation and development proceed. Social modalities (socially accepted forms of 'becoming someone') stimulate, select, and utilize his developing modes of behavior, e.g. the incorporated oral mode [Erikson, 1950]. This is the genetic analogue of Hartmann's systematic definition. This is so far the only attempt to conceptualize the phases of epigenesis [Erikson, 1940, 1950] through which pre-adaptiveness develops and in which the processes of adaptation firmly link behavioral epigenesis with environmental conditions" [1, p. 59, 61].

It turns out that through the reality principle, Freud and his followers introduced elements of epistemology and even philosophy into their theories. In this respect, psychoanalysis represents a hybrid doctrine, a kind of centaur: the primary process is a psychological construction, the secondary process is an epistemological and cognitive one.

Rapaport equates theory construction with systematization, suggesting not to confuse it with axiomatization and measurements. "The fact is", he writes, "that in contemporary psychology, the measurement fad seems to have entered an unholy alliance with the axiomatization fad, and this could doom psychology to stagnation... Psychoanalysis urgently needs systematization because without it, the experimenter is likely to continue testing isolated and misinterpreted propositions, unaware of their actual theoretical context. But systematization is far from formalization and axiomatization" [ibid., p. 104].

One can certainly agree with these statements, but the question arises: do they not contradict the natural scientific approach that Rapaport tries to follow? However, as we have shown, he follows it rather inconsistently; as a result, his theory of psychoanalysis looks quite substantive and interesting.

In my opinion, Rapaport's work also provides material for understanding the peculiarities of Freud's discourse. This discourse is two-layered: in one layer, Freud thinks as a humanist and even, partly, as a philosopher, while in the other, he condenses the distinctions obtained in the first layer into schematic constructions (e.g. "drive → direct satisfaction of drive" or "drive → mediated satisfaction"), in order to unfold them again into broader humanitarian narratives (reasonings) in the next step. Freud outlines this methodology already in his early research. For example, in the article "Fraulein Elisabeth von R.'s Case History", he describes a case of illness that he managed to cure through suggestion.

"Everything indicated that the matter stood thus and not otherwise. The girl had bestowed her tender affection on her brother-in-law, the realization of which her entire moral being resisted. She needed to avoid realizing the unbearable truth, which consisted in her loving her sister's husband, and for this purpose she inflicted physical pain upon herself. At those moments when this truth became evident to her consciousness: during walks with him, morning fantasies, bathing in the bath, at the bedside of her dying sister - the pains appeared as a result of successful conversion into the somatic sphere. By the time I began treatment, the complex of ideas connected with the feeling that had overcome her was already quite isolated from her consciousness. I think that otherwise she would never have agreed to such treatment; the resistance she repeatedly demonstrated, opposing the reproduction of scenes directly related to the trauma, actually corresponded to the energy expended on repressing the unbearable idea from associative connection...

'So, you have been in love with your brother-in-law for a long time,' I said dryly. Elisabeth cried out loudly and immediately complained of terrible pains. She made one more desperate attempt to avoid the explanation: namely, that it was not true, that I had suggested it to her, that it could not be, that she was incapable of such baseness, that she would never forgive herself for it. It was not difficult to prove to her that her own statements admitted of no other interpretation; but the resistance continued long enough, until two of my comforting arguments - that, after all, one cannot be held responsible for one's feelings and that her illness itself is convincing evidence of her moral purity - had the proper effect on her" [10, p. 93-95; 11, p. 59-61].

Freud's account is a humanitarian narrative. As I show, based on this narrative, Freud constructs several schemes which he later transforms into the first conception of the psyche (agencies - consciousness, preconscious, unconscious). Here are two examples of these schematic constructions along with the narratives explaining them.

"But how could it have happened", Freud asks, "that such an affectively charged group of ideas became so isolated? For usually, the greater the magnitude of the affect, the more significant a role the idea associated with that affect plays in the associative process.

This question can be answered by taking into account two facts, which we can judge with complete certainty, namely: (1) simultaneously with the formation of this isolated group of ideas, hysterical pains arose, and (2) the patient offered strong resistance to any attempt

to establish a connection between this isolated group and other content components of consciousness; when, finally, this connection was established, she experienced severe mental pain. Consciousness cannot foresee when exactly the unbearable idea will arise. The unbearable idea is excluded and forms an isolated psychic group together with everything connected to it. But initially, it must have been present in consciousness, entering the main stream of thoughts, otherwise the conflict that causes such an exclusion would not have arisen. It is precisely these moments that we consider 'traumatic'; it is then that conversion takes place, the results of which are the splitting of consciousness and the hysterical symptom" [11, p. 64-65, 69, 71]. "Thanks to the study of hypnotic phenomena", writes Freud, "we have become accustomed to the understanding, which initially seemed extremely foreign to us, namely, that in one and the same individual several mental groupings are possible, which can exist in one individual fairly independently of each other, can know nothing of each other, and which, alternating in consciousness, are torn away from one another. If, in such a splitting of personality, consciousness is constantly attached to one of the personalities, then this latter is called the conscious mental state, and the personality separated from it is called the unconscious... we have an excellent example of the influence that a conscious state can experience from the unconscious" [8, p. 17].

I show that these constructions were obtained, on the one hand, based on a number of Freud's theoretical assumptions (primarily the natural scientific one), and on the other hand, by condensing (schematizing) the humanitarian narrative presented above [12, p. 18].

Where, one might ask, does Freud get the ideas of the splitting of consciousness, the formation of an isolated group of ideas in consciousness, or later, resistance? Is this not a transfer into the psychic realm of his interactions with Elisabeth and other patients? For example, Freud introduces the phenomenon of resistance into the psyche primarily to theoretically make sense of Elisabeth's resistance. The latter initially strongly objected, denying Freud's version, believing she was incapable of such a thing (and perhaps that was indeed the case). But Freud managed, through suggestion and reinterpreting the events that occurred, to convince Elisabeth of his interpretation. And subsequently, he began to act similarly: he suggested to clients his own explanation of the causes of their illness, overcoming their resistance and distrust. To consolidate this type of communication and interaction in theory, he introduces the concept of resistance, positing not only a struggle of opposing drives, a splitting of personality and consciousness, a fall of one area of consciousness from the general field, but also an obstacle to the return of its isolated part into the general field of consciousness. "In another conceptualization, for example, according to Carl Rogers, resistance could be interpreted completely differently, for instance, as a refusal to accept an incorrect interpretation or as an unwillingness to restore the integrity of the personal experience, or to discuss personal problems with a stranger" [13].

So, to explain Elisabeth's resistance, as well as a number of other observed reactions of patients, in a physicalist key, Freud attributes to consciousness the capacity for splitting, isolating its individual parts, and resisting when the psychotherapist attempts to introduce the isolated part of consciousness into the general field of consciousness. Solving other research and practical tasks, Freud performs the reverse operation: he unfolds the schematic constructions into narratives, which he then studies and thinks about in humanitarian and philosophical terms. The same logic is implemented by Freud when he works with the schematic constructions of the primary and secondary processes: unfolding them into narratives, Freud builds complex humanitarian and philosophical reasonings, obtains new distinctions, which he then condenses into new constructions. It is in this way that Freud creates, for example, the concepts of the drive object and reality.

Conclusion

The reconstruction of Freud's work and discourse presented here, in my opinion, also helps to understand some aspects of the theory and systematization that Rapaport proposes, in particular, the central construction "drive → mediation → satisfaction of drive", where mediation is understood as a secondary process based on the reality principle and the search for the drive object. David Rapaport's book is highly heuristic; the propositions formulated in it make one think and ask questions. Although this study was written over half a century ago, it remains relevant both psychologically and methodologically.

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