

Personality: Author's Concept, Genesis, Typology

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Abstract

The article proposes the author's concept of personality, based on cultural-historical reconstruction and a methodological approach. Problems are formulated that make it possible to construct this concept: is personality an epiphenomenon, how to comprehend the transition of a person to independent behavior at the turn of the end of the 2nd, middle of the 1st millennium BC. e., understanding the conflict between the emerging ancient personality and the social collective (polis), explaining the figures of "I" and "persona", the problem of assembling personality on the basis of a "constituent authority", as well as the proliferation of concepts of personality in the culture of modern times. Since the Renaissance, a variety of concepts of personality have appeared on the scene: personality as the "second God" of Nicholas of Cusa, personality placed at the "center of the world", guided by his own desires (Pico della Mirandola), Kantian personality balancing between "freedom over natural necessity" and adherence to public morality and law, the creative personality of artists and scientists, the religious and esoteric personality, the conformist personality, the pathological and criminal personality, etc. Four cycles of the formation and development of personality are outlined. The first, virtual, is the construction of a scheme and ideal objects that resolve problems regarding the individual. Second, practicing a new understanding of personality. Third, the formation of personality as a real social and mental phenomenon. The fourth stage, comprehension and research of the established personality phenomenon. Currently, personality is going through a crisis, so it is important not only to study it, but also to work on the formation of a new concept of personality, which, on the one hand, would take into account the existing concepts of personality in terms of comprehension, and on the other hand, would be focused on the challenges of the time and the problems of the emerging culture ("futurecultures").

Keywords: *Personality; Individual; Culture; History; Reconstruction; Modernity; Concept; Formation; Development; Sociality*

I'll immediately explain why it's the author's concept and not a general one. The fact is that currently the concept of personality looks very polysemantic and unclear: firstly, different researchers and practitioners put different content into this concept, and secondly, there are three important concepts in modern humanitarian and social thinking - personality, individual, subject differ poorly, their meanings overlap [10]. It is certainly possible to try to organize this field of meanings and contents in a consistent manner, but again this will be another version of the concept of personality; it is unlikely that other participants in scientific communication will agree to give up their understanding without a fight. Therefore, the best strategy in modern conditions can be considered another: without pretending to be universally valid, formulate your own understanding of the concept of personality, relate to other understandings of this concept, expose

the author's concept of personality for free discussion and criticism. Since we have already presented our attitude to other basic concepts of personality in the book "Personality and Its Study" and several articles, we will focus on solving the first problem [7].

Taking into account the state of modern scientific communication, let us first characterize the approach and methodology of personality research (knowing them, other participants in the discussion will be able to more easily develop an attitude towards the author's concept). We believe that concepts are created in a particular scientific discipline and, therefore, are subject to the logic and norms of thinking of this discipline; in addition, concepts describe the main characteristics of "ideal objects" that are constructed in this discipline. The ideal object is the concept of "philosophy of science". It is believed that cognition of phenomena is carried out by constructing ideal objects representing these phenomena. In turn, the researcher attributes to ideal objects such properties (Kant says, "attributes a priori", and I, solving cognitive problems, following a certain methodology), which allow one to think consistently, solve problems, and re-think empirical material (facts) [9, p. 59-60]. In this case, the author's version of personology acts as a scientific discipline, and the norms are set by "methodology with limited liability" [11, p. 56-71].

The problems that confronted me, and which I solved by creating ideal objects, were connected, on the one hand, with the methodology and genesis of personality that I proposed (mainly with phylogeny, partly with ontogenesis), on the other - with philosophical and scientific polemics about the essence of personality. Let me briefly describe these problems.

The first is whether personality is an epiphenomenon, as my teacher, G.P., once polemically argued. Shchedrovitsky. "From all sides", he said, "I hear: man!..personality!..All this is a lie: I am a vessel with living, self-developing thinking, I am thinking, its hypostasis and materialization, an organism of thought. And nothing more... I always mean one thing: I am the bollard, the servant of my thinking, and then there are the actions of thinking, mine and others, which, in particular, communicate. At some point - I was about twenty years old at the time - I felt an amazing transformation that happened to me: I realized that thinking had taken over me and that this was my value and my essence as a person... All our behavior is just a reflection and imprint of power sociocultural forms we use, but not the creation of the individual mind" [17, p. 9, 12].

And this despite the fact that Shchedrovitsky himself was a bright personality. However, this is exactly how he probably felt himself - a hypostasis and materialization of sociocultural forms (we will call this non-individual, cultural-historical whole "social").

Unlike my teacher, I always accepted two principles - the individual and the social whole, believing that since antiquity, the features of European culture have been determined by the interaction of these two principles. Every personality is a social subject, but also a component and sometimes a point of growth of culture. For example, the same Shchedrovitsky, on the one hand, was a law-abiding citizen and in this sense a full-fledged social subject, and on the other hand, the pioneer of discursivity in methodology, i.e. point of cultural growth. He built this second hypostasis of his, realizing himself as a person.

As a person, the individual is determined not only by the social whole (and culture), but by his own, immanent constitution. Although the latter develops in the course of solving cultural problems (which are often perceived as personal problems), this solution is determined by the individual characteristics and creativity of a person. As a result, the personality is formed - a second whole along with the social whole. Shchedrovitsky thought, following the norms and nature of thinking, but he followed them not like others, but in accordance with his personality, its characteristics and problems. In Shchedrovitsky, thinking acquired its new existence - personal, "Shchedrovitsky", and since Shchedrovitsky had a great influence on people and there were many of his followers, the Shchedrovitsky trace remained in thinking. As well as the traces of other great thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Marx, Freud...).

The second problem is how to comprehend the transition of a person to independent behavior at the turn of the end of the 2nd to the middle of the 1st millennium BC. e. Individual behavior is characterized by independent behavior, but before ancient culture, sociality was

structured in such a way that the independence of an individual person was not allowed. Starting from the end of the 2nd millennium, there was a deep crisis in the culture of the Ancient Kingdoms, which led to disappointment in the gods, who, according to the ancients, were supposed to guide and support people [5, p. 85, 108, 120, 122, 149]. As a consequence, individuals abandon reliance on gods, switching to independent behavior; a necessary condition for such a transformation is the construction of “private schemes” that allow one to reach one’s own understanding of the world and oneself in it. In other words, the process of becoming an ancient personality begins.

From the point of view of cognition, I define this process as the construction of ideal objects in phylogenesis. In turn, ideal objects are built based on schemes that are invented by individuals in order to solve problems that arise in culture. Schemes define an understanding of what is happening and a new reality, the latter, within the framework of thinking, can be represented and comprehended with the help of ideal objects. For example, in the Symposium, Plato, through the mouth of his hero Aristophanes, first builds a diagram of androgynes. Zeus cut the androgynes into halves (these halves are likened to lovers) and scattered them all over the world, but each half began to look for its other part. Then, based on this scheme, Aristophanes gives a definition of new love, namely, love is the search for one’s half and the desire for the whole (it is the definition that defines love as an ideal object) [13, p. 18].

In ontogenesis we are talking about the process of personality formation at the stage of completion of the “culture of childhood” and the requirement for independence coming from parents and other adults [14].

The third problem is understanding the conflict between the emerging ancient individual and the social collective (polis). Moving on to independent behavior, the individual comes to ideas about the world and himself that do not coincide with those generally accepted in the polis. The result is a social conflict that is resolved through compromise on both sides. “Personally oriented” practices are formed (ancient legal proceedings, art, platonic love, thinking), within the framework of which the individual adapts to the requirements of society (the polis), and the latter makes concessions. If at the dawn of antiquity Socrates is sentenced to death, then at the end of the day Apuleius wins the trial, although he expresses his personal convictions, citing the example of Socrates and saying that the main thing is “by what principles a person decided to live his life”.

The fourth problem is the formation of the figure “I” in late antiquity. The ancient “I” is perceived, on the one hand, as a “person” who has the right (to own property, to represent oneself in court), on the other, as a role in social communication (for her, the model was the “mask”, a role in the ancient theater). In “Metamorphoses” by Apuleius, the hero Lucius, due to tragicomic circumstances, found himself in the body of a donkey, however, he realizes his Self as a person and tries to appeal to citizens with a request for salvation [3]. Here the Self is interpreted not only as a social role representing the individual, but also as an “inner principle” that claims to control actions. Personal properties such as self, social role, internal, management are another characteristics of the developing personality as an ideal object.

The fifth problem for the author was the analysis of the behavior and actions of St. Augustine, which he talks about in his Confessions. “Meanwhile”, Augustine recalls, “a new will was born in me - to serve You selflessly and enjoy You, my God, as the only source of true pleasures. But this will was still so weak that it could not defeat the will that dominated me... Thus, two wills fought in me, the old and the new, the carnal and the spiritual, and in this struggle my soul was torn... Between therefore, I, who served in the field of struggle, was one and the same... I approved one thing, and followed another... But let them disappear from Thy presence, O God... those who, seeing two wills in the struggle of our spirit, claim that in There are two spiritual principles of opposite nature, one good and the other evil. By harboring such wicked thoughts, they admit themselves to be evil; meanwhile, they could be kind if they abandoned these thoughts” [2, p. 103-108].

It turns out that in order for a person to act effectively, his consciousness and will must be holistic, collecting into unity the individual partial selves that were formed in the previous development. It can be assumed that a necessary condition for the formation of personality is the formation of a special “constitutive” authority of the psyche, which ensures the periodic assembly of the integral self. Augustine recalls a period of his development where this authority was just taking shape.

The sixth problem already relates to the New Age, when the individual was put in charge of shaping society. The question is, what traits was she endowed with in order to serve both herself and society? Kant answers: on the one hand, the individual “is freedom over natural necessity” (the latter, as we see, was first discussed by Augustine), on the other hand, in order to serve society and others, the individual must follow duty and morality, corrected by reason. “This”, writes the great German philosopher, “is nothing more than personality, that is, freedom and independence from the mechanism of all nature, considered at the same time as the ability of a being that is subject to special, namely given by its own mind, pure practical laws...The moral law is sacred (inviolable). Man, it’s true, is not so holy, but humanity in his person should be sacred to him” [4, p. 509-511]. In different periods of modernity and in different types of sociality, the relationship between freedom and adherence to social norms (morality, law, laws) was different, from the complete subordination of the individual to the state (in totalitarian types) to a kind of anarchy in revolutionary times.

The seventh problem is understanding and explaining different personality types. Personality in modern times is a population (multiple phenomenon): empirically we observe a “unique personality” like Socrates or A. Schweitzer, a “mass personality” who makes decisions according to generally accepted customs and rules, an “asocial personality” (including “pathological”), “religious and esoteric personality”, etc. (see in more detail our work “Mental illness as a trend in the development of personality and the state of culture” [12].

In the twentieth century, in addition to the formation of personality through its self (as Fichte wrote, it builds itself), personality begins to be consciously formed in various practices (psychoanalysis, neurolinguistic programming, ideologically oriented media, education, etc.). The pioneer here was S. Freud, who developed the method of disguised suggestion. “Apparently, it is no coincidence”, writes A. Sosland, “the history of psychotherapy began with hypnosis... The principle of non-interference, introduced into therapeutic practice, creates the illusion of minimal participation of the therapist” [16, p. 233, 258]. By offering the subject well-defined schemes and using them to interpret the problems and personality traits of this subject, it is possible to determine his behavior and actions for a time or a longer period. Outwardly, it looks like a purposeful formation of personality is taking place. But is this really so? The problem is whether inspired structures can really displace naturally formed ones (change the latter or form a symbiosis with them), and if they can, then under what conditions?

I think that the purposeful formation of personality forms one of the contexts of the personality crisis of modernity, the others are the crisis of personality-oriented practices, first of all, law and thinking, as well as the institutions of family, school and state, especially the latter, given that the state from the very beginning of its formation tried to establish personality under your control. “Every European state, and subsequently every other state after 1798”, writes Martin Creveld, “wanted to be sure that the daily activities of the population were under its control and, as far as possible, served the goals of that very state. The most important means of achieving this were the police and prison apparatus, education and social security systems <...> The state not only used science and technology to expand its capabilities, to wage wars with other states, but it used the same means to strengthen control over every square inch of the country’s territory and over the life of every subject” [6, p. 165-166, 209-210].

If we draw a line under the problematization of the personality and the definition of the characteristics of the personality as an ideal object (posing problems, as is known, is an open process), then the author’s concept of personality includes the following characteristics: the personality is in complex relationships with the social whole; she is characterized by independent behavior, building a private world and herself in it; the personality is connected with the social whole through personality-oriented practices; the organization of her psyche and consciousness presupposes the figure of the Self and the constitutive authority, ensuring the unity of the personality; personality is a popular and emerging phenomenon; finally, it is currently experiencing a crisis.

It can be noticed that This understanding of personality is partially reflected in a number of its definitions, most closely in the understanding of personality by V.S. Bibler, Fichte, A.N. Leontyev, Z. Bauman. The personal understanding of personality demonstrated here, so to speak, forces us to discuss the possibility of its multiple existence. Let's do this using the example of understanding love as one of the personality-oriented practices.

Initially, in the Symposium, Plato solves the problem of love for the emerging ancient personality on a semiotic plane: he creates schemes and ideal objects that solve this problem. In other words, at this stage, platonic love is a virtual phenomenon. Since the schemes of the "Feast" attracted the attention of the ancient personality, the practice of platonic love begins with the use of these schemes (second stage). As a result, platonic love emerges as a real social phenomenon, as a new practice of love (third stage). It begins to be comprehended and studied (fourth stage). This, in our opinion, is the cycle of formation and development of social phenomena, including personality.

The second cycle of the formation and development of love was associated with overcoming the shortcomings of the design of platonic love. Plato defined love in such a way that the sensual aspect was largely eliminated in it; in addition, the highest form of love, according to Plato, is love not for a woman, but for a beautiful young man. In the Middle Ages, in courtly love, these two shortcomings were overcome, and at first precisely on the semiotic plane. In courtly love texts, both the sensual side of love and the image of a beautiful lady were cultivated. "He", we read in the medieval text "Donna, I belong to you", "who feels inclination for a lady and often visits her, without daring, however, to convince her, is a timid "lurker". But if the lady showed him respect and reassured him so much that he decided to express his request to her, he becomes a "pleading one". If, through persuasion, he achieved that she gives him a cord, a belt or a glove, or some other name, small or large, he has risen to the level of "admirer". If she falls in love with her admirer and she wants to kiss him, give him her love and put him under the blanket with her, he is elevated to the level of "friend" [18]. Then followed the three stages indicated above: the knights practiced courtly love, its formation as a real social phenomenon, comprehension and study of this new practice of love.

The third cycle of the formation and development of love dates back to the New Age. Here, based on the concepts of platonic and courtly love, two main concepts were first built: in Dreiser's novels, "American love", which involves a change of partners in marriage, and a whole series of concepts of "romantic love". An individual experience of loving behavior and experience develops, which is often declared and manifested as the norm, as the nature of love. So, if some individuals exalt love, others degrade it, some consider marriage and love incompatible, others speak out for their union, some exclude sexual desire from "true love", others believe that without it, without this "chemistry", love does not exist, etc. In addition, love in the culture of modern times is a unique object of study, a subject of knowledge and reflection. And if so, then certain properties and characteristics are attributed to love, resulting from reasoning about love, which is naturally different. Love is correlated in thought with other phenomena and characteristics of a person. Having become an object of knowledge, love turns into an ideal object. Another point is that love is psychologized, this is due to the new European understanding of love as a certain form of behavior and qualities of a new European personality. Neither Aphrodite nor the Christian God is anymore responsible for love, only the person himself, his character, beliefs, temperament, inclinations, needs" [15, p. 141-153]. In modern European culture (often called "modernity" in sociology), love is already a popular (multiple in existential terms) phenomenon.

Conclusion

The cycles of the concept of personality are also visible based on the same cultural shifts. In ancient culture, personality is just becoming, here the main thing for it is the constitution of the private world and oneself in it, as well as the development of a relationship with the polis. In the Middle Ages, a Christian personality emerged, for which the central problem was the balance of relationships with God. This, for example, is clearly seen in the famous letters of "Heloise to Abelard". "All my life", writes Eloise, "no matter what -happens, I am more afraid of offending you than of God; I'm more eager to please you than him. I became a nun not for the sake of divine love, but by your will... God knows that in the same way, without any doubt, by your will, I would have followed you or would have forestalled you, even if you had hastened to the domain of Vulcan, for my soul was not with me, but with you! Even now, if she is not with you, then she is

nowhere: truly, without you, my soul cannot exist in any way <...> In whatever corner of the sky God places me, I will be content. After all, there no one will envy anyone, and everyone will be content with what he has" [1, p. 70, 87, 88].

In modern times, a variety of concepts of personality have come onto the scene: the personality as the "second God" of Nicholas of Cusa, the personality placed at the "center of the world", guided by its own desires (Pico della Mirandola), the Kantian personality balancing between "freedom over natural necessity" and adherence to public morality and law, the creative personality of artists and scientists, religious and esoteric personality, conformist personality, pathological and criminal personality, etc. (See also [12,18]).

Since personality is currently experiencing a crisis, it is important not only to study it, but also to work on the formation of a new concept of personality, which, on the one hand, would take into account the existing concepts of personality in terms of comprehension, and on the other hand, would be focused on the challenges of the time and the problems of the emerging culture ("futurecultures"). I assume that the author's cultural, historical and methodological concept of personality presented here should help in the formation of this new concept of personality.

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