

## One of the Points “Outsidedness” in Relation to Modern Psychology (Notes Methodology)

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### Abstract

The author, realizing a methodological approach, analyzes the situation in modern psychology, considering requirements of psychology from the culture, discusses ways to overcome the crisis in psychological science and practice. Describing the epistemological status of psychological knowledge, he reconstructs one of the earliest works of Freud and shows an important role in psychological thinking and creative schemes and ideal objects.

**Keywords:** *Crisis; Problem; Science; Practice; Knowledge; Theory; Scheme; Ideal Objects*

### Intelligent landscape

To an inexperienced person, psychology may seem a thriving field of knowledge and activity. Indeed, psychologists speak on television, give advice on how to live in a family and how to cope with stress, comment on the decisions of deputies, and advise on a variety of issues, from the choice of profession to the sphere of intimate relations. The interest in psychology is not least due to the fact that psychologists appeal to science and believe that they have knowledge of the human inner world. Then a well-known scheme is triggered: if there is scientific knowledge about a person, then it is possible to control the behavior of a person with the help of this knowledge. “To know something,” writes Yu. B. Hippenreiter means to master this “something”, to learn how to manage it... it must be especially emphasized that, knowing oneself, a person will change himself... we can say that psychology is a science not only knowing, but also constructing, creating man” [2. S. 9].

At the same time, a number of psychologists are constantly talking about a crisis of psychology. “For never again,” writes A.A. Bubbles, the question of the consistency of psychology in the face of a person’s real life problems did not sound as acute as it is today, did not literally become for her a question of life or death” [5. S. 16]. But perhaps psychology as a science has gripped the crisis, but is there no crisis in the field of practical psychology?

It is believed, for example, that psychoanalysis has achieved the greatest success. But even the most outstanding examples of psychoanalytic work, in particular, some cases from the practice of Freud, are not able to serve as examples of complete cure. Here is how Freud’s contribution is assessed by the famous French psychotherapist L. Shertok: “A rather paradoxical thing turned out: Freud’s theory, the theory of psychoanalysis, being a brilliant contribution to fundamental science... did not, as it turned out, create anything super-effective in that area that and was primarily designed - in the field of psychotherapy... In 1937, in his famous article “Finite and Endless Analysis” Freud forced to note that the actual medical effect of psychoanalysis is neither predictable, nor reliable, nor final” [12. S. 44].

Or another problem: modern psychology has split into two almost independent areas - psychological science and psychological practice, between which a real wall of misunderstanding quickly grows. “Domestic psychology,” writes F. Vasilyuk, “has changed so dramatically over the past decade that it seems to belong to a different “biological” species than the psychology of the 1980 model... Anyone who is seriously concerned about the fate of our psychology must be aware of the very real danger of its degeneration into a third-rate decrepit and barren science, by inertia smoldering behind academic walls and powerlessly watching through the loopholes for the rapid and unceremonious growth of primitive, and even frankly demonic, mass pop psychology, profaning as those worthy areas of foreign psychology that they blindly copy, and psychology in general, ignoring the cultural and spiritual characteristics of the distribution environment. This is not some kind of distant danger. Thunder has already struck” [1].

“The formation of two socio-digms - psychological communities engaged mainly in academic or practical psychology,” noted T. Kornilova and S. Smirnov, “is one of the manifestations of this social aspect of the modern stage of the crisis [3. S. 141].

The above statements do not agree well with the usual idea of psychology. Questions arise: is psychology flourishing or is undergoing a deep crisis, is psychological practice effective or not? And another, no less difficult question: who is a psychologist as a specialist? Judging by the current situation, a psychologist can be, firstly, a scientist, and secondly, a practitioner (practicing psychologist). However, in the first case, the question may arise, how does a psychologist differ from other scientists studying a person, for example, a philosopher, sociologist, culturologist, physiologist, in the second - from a doctor, priest, engineer, teacher.

For example, many philosophers argue that the focus of their attention is precisely the person and the problems of his existence. Therefore, it is no coincidence that a number of psychologists borrow their initial ideas about a person from philosophy, and besides, as is known, from physiology, logic, cultural studies, semiotics, information theory and other traditional or latest disciplines. In due time P. Ya. Halperin in his Introduction to Psychology noted that until now psychologists are looking for mechanisms of psychic phenomena either in physiology or in logic, but in general - outside psychology.

### Psychology and the requirements of modern culture

W. Nysser wrote that psychological science should respond to the needs of modern life. However, it is known that many philosophers and cultural scientists evaluate modern life as being embraced by a deep crisis. “Hope for culture,” S. Neretina writes, “and now almost everyone nods at it and no matter what, that’s why they now have no previous weight... they talk about it so much because it has passed away. She appeared as the central concept of twentieth-century philosophy. Its universal charm is the charm of a dead culture... The processes that are taking place today can be called post-Christian because we entered a different world of ethics, or rather not - or non-ethics, if only because the 20<sup>th</sup> century is the century when killerhood became a profession. And this cannot be ignored... Today we have the right to raise the question of the end of culture. Not about the end of life, not about the death of a person, but about the end of culture as a phenomenon that had its beginning and, accordingly, must have its own end... Therefore, in my opinion, now, in the era of transition, it is necessary not to rely on culture (akin to a religious plea). Criticism of cultural reason is necessary...” [4. S. 226, 227, 271, 273].

The main question that arises in connection with this assessment of the cultural situation is how modern psychology should respond to a cultural crisis. One answer is this: in any way, it is not the business of psychologists to help overcome the cultural crisis, they have their own professional tasks and concerns. If they begin to do this, then sooner or later they will deprofessionalize. In addition, the psyche is not the soul, if you can talk about saving the soul, it’s ridiculous to talk about saving the psyche, you can study it, you can influence it, but save - how can this come to mind?

Another answer is exactly the opposite: psychologists, but certainly not alone, should help overcome the crisis of culture and civilization, promote the formation of a new culture, more humane and spiritual. In this sense, they must deal with the human soul. In his time (back in the 1920s), reflecting on a similar problem, M. Bakhtin noted that the soul problem is methodologically a problem of aesthetics, it

cannot be a problem of psychology, science is priceless and causal, because the soul, although it is developing and becoming in time, there is an individual, value and free whole. M. Bakhtin rightly observes that modern psychology, guided by the natural-scientific ideal (which, indeed, presupposes the so-called strictly objective, invaluable approach and analysis of causal relations), cannot deal with the human soul. For Bakhtin, both soul and personality are unique, individual whole, fundamentally incomplete, expressing themselves in accordance with the current, again unique, dialogue.

And here is the position of V. Frankl. On the one hand, he agrees that the tasks of psychology and religion are different. “The goal of psychotherapy is the healing of the soul, the goal of religion is the salvation of the soul” [8. S. 334]. But on the other, he emphasizes that if we understand faith broadly, humanistically, then the goals of psychology and religion may partially coincide. Frankl writes: “... we are not moving towards universal, but towards a personal, deeply personalized religiosity, with which everyone can communicate with God in their own, personal, intimate language”. “If psychotherapy does not consider the phenomenon of faith as faith in God, but as a broader belief in meaning (below Frankl says that a special case of meaning is super sense and that “religious faith is ultimately a belief in super sense, a hope for super sense”. - VR), then in principle it she has the right to include the phenomenon of faith in the sphere of her attention and to deal with it. Here she is at the same time with Albert Einstein, for whom to ask about the meaning of life means to be religious” [8. P. 10].

I must say that psychology in our country and in the West is developing in different ways: in particular, we are more sensitive to the crisis of psychology, especially in the field of psychological science. Speaking about the crisis of psychological science, I mean the decline in interest in fundamental psychological theories and schools, the growing criticism of its foundations and methodology, the breakdown of academic psychology and new psychological practices (after L.S. Vygotsky they can be called psychotechnicians, and so they develop independently outside the traditional building of psychology), finally, a general feeling of ill-being in the field of psychological sciences (for example, everyone finds it difficult to indicate its leaders). True, one can disagree with this assessment and say that this is all normal development, dozens, if not hundreds of psychological institutes and laboratories, tens and hundreds of thousands of psychologists work, that interest in psychology and psychologists is quite high, psychology is quite effective. But is it?

### The search for ways to further develop psychology

I do not think that at present it is worth returning to the program of L.S. Vygotsky in 1927, which proposed overcoming the crisis in psychology along the paths of natural-scientific psychologists, although many psychologists would love to do this. For example, raising the thesis of polyparadigmism as a flag, of the need to recognize different areas and schools of psychological science, interpreting the psyche differently, T. Kornilova and S. Smirnov in their book immediately return to discussing the issue of a single general psychological concept, hinting that activity theory, updated on the basis of phenomenology, analytical philosophy of consciousness, cognitive psychology, may well act as a general psychological concept. Recognizing that an experiment in psychology involves interference in the psyche and its transformation, the authors of the book constantly say that a psychological experiment is designed to reveal what is (exists) in the psyche, primarily causal relationships.

In my opinion, the recipe of my teacher G.P. Shchedrovitsky is also not good - to reflect all the basic activities and ways of thinking that have developed in psychology and reorganize them on a new basis of the methodological theory of thought activity (Shchedrovitsky outlined this program for the development of psychology in 1981). In my opinion, the weakness of the proposed Shchedrovitsky pathway arises, firstly, due to the lack of interested cooperation with psychologists, secondly, insufficient knowledge of the problems in psychology, and thirdly, the nature of the attitudes of the methodology of science in the Shchedrovitsky version. I called Shchedrovitsky's methodology “panmethodology”, contrasting it with a “limited liability methodology” based on a humanitarian approach and culturologists [7. S. 297-310]. Another circumstance is indicated by A.A. Bubbles. “The idea of the methodological organization of psychology as a sphere of MD

(thought activity. - VR) does not enter” into any gate of psychology... Moreover, paradoxically! - not only at the gates of scientific psychology itself, but also the so-called practical... The methodology “drowned” and “dissolved” in the game movement, was absorbed and “crushed” by it” [6. S. 125-126].

It is hardly possible to do nothing, considering that let everything go by itself, as it goes. It goes without saying that only the further separation of psychological science and practice, the division of psychology into natural science and the humanities, and the growing divergence in views of different psychological schools and directions (both theoretical and practical) will continue. Of course, there will be a further decline in the culture of thinking of psychologists, their, so to speak, methodological savagery.

Although many psychologists claim that psychology represents knowledge about a person as such (science) or defines universal methods of influence (practice), the analysis shows the following:

- The psychologist speaks not on behalf of the universal absolute subject of knowledge or practical action, but on his own behalf and that private community, that private practice into which he enters, whose ideas he shares.
- The psychologist, in fact, does not mean a person in history and in different cultures, but a modern person, and often only a person. Because the personality, that only she consciously turns to psychology. The personality as a person acting independently, trying to build his life, needs the knowledge, schemes and practices that psychology provides. Therefore, in particular, Russian psychologists, although in words for the cultural-historical concept of L.S. Vygotsky, in fact, cannot accept it.
- The psychologist adheres to the traditions of his workshop, which involves the installation of science and rationality, of understanding a person as an independent object and reality (in this regard, the psychologist instinctively does not want to consider a person as included in culture or history, as fundamentally determined by sociocultural and historical circumstances). It is worth recognizing that the tradition of psychology also includes a different attitude towards man: as a natural phenomenon (natural-scientific approach) and as a phenomenon of the spirit or person understood humanitarily.
- In an epistemological respect, the psychologist is set on the speed and model of knowledge, so he creates only partial ideas about the psyche. The complex, heterogeneous representations deployed in some psychological concepts of personality do not allow building operational models. But the partiality of psychological representations and schemes, as a natural payment for science, presupposes the retention of integrity and life, which V. Dilthey, and later M. Bakhtin and S. Averintsev, once pointed out.

### Epistemological status of psychological knowledge

Z. Hjelmslev and D. Ziegler, discussing the epistemological status of psychological theories of personality, write the following. “The theory provides a semantic framework or scheme that allows us to simplify and interpret everything that we know about the corresponding class of events. For example, without the help of a theory (obviously, the psychoanalysis of Z. Freud. - VR), it would be difficult to explain why a five-year-old Raymond has such a strong romantic attachment to his mother, while his father causes him an excessive feeling of indignation” [11. S. 26].

That is, these authors believe that as a result of constructing a psychological theory, schemes are created. However, from the philosophy of science, we know that theory does not deal with schemes, but with ideal objects. Nevertheless, the connection between ideal objects and schemes in psychology present here is probably not accidental. Subtle psychologist and methodologist F.E. Vasilyuk also “through and” writes about schemes and ideal objects: ontology, in his opinion, is defined by a scheme and contains ideal objects. “Ontology, we call the overall picture of the studied area of reality, which this researcher has. For I.P. Pavlova such a picture is the scheme “environment”. The leading and determining relationship between the elements of this scheme is the balancing relationship.

The main ideal objects of Pavlovsk ontology are unconditioned and conditioned reflexes. Actually, we are talking here about one ideal object - the reflex, since the discovery of two types of reflexes - conditional and unconditioned - did not affect the very concept of reflex” [1].

In the same work, Vasilyuk introduces the concept of a “central category”. “So, no matter what concept we try to put into the basis of the psychotechnical system, making it the central subject of reflex or gestalt, self-consciousness or dialogue, character or experience, we can count on the scientific and practical usefulness of such a system only if this concept can play the role of a central category. The central category of the psychotechnical system must satisfy the following criteria.

Serve as the ideological basis of effective practical methods, that is, on the one hand, be their constructive principle, allowing you to create such methods and techniques, and on the other, their explanatory principle, which allows you to scientifically explain the mechanism of action of both your own and borrowed methods.

And, finally, the most important thing: the central category must be such that on its basis it is possible to form a special psychotechnical method, which, along with practical efficiency, is the optimal empirical research method for the subject expressed by this central category. Not a simple sum, but an organic synthesis of practical efficiency and cognitive productivity - this is the norm of the psychotechnical method” (italics ours. - VR) [1].

Note, “an organic synthesis of practical effectiveness and cognitive productivity.” What does this mean in epistemological terms? For a cognitive attitude (plan), we should probably be talking about ideal objects and objects of study, and for a practical one, about schemes. In other words, asserting the psychotechnical approach, F. Vasilyuk works simultaneously with ideal objects and schemes. In this case, their relationship becomes clear: in the field of psychological cognition, ideal objects are created, and in psychological practice they begin to live like patterns.

But F. Vasilyuk can be interpreted differently, namely, that both a scientist and a practitioner in psychology immediately deal with both ideal objects (objects of study) and schemes. Otherwise, how to understand his thesis: “Splitting, which threatens to split psychology into two disciplines, can be overcome by the development of a psychotechnical approach that introduces psychological practice into psychological science, and science into practice” [1].

To understand, we will consider one early work of Z. Freud. He is trying to help his patient Elizabeth von R. and at the same time understand how the human psyche is generally structured. After a long search, Freud finds the cause of her illness. He writes the following. “So you have long been in love with your son-in-law,” I said dryly. Elizabeth screamed out loud and immediately complained of terrible pain. She made another desperate attempt to avoid an explanation: they say it’s not true, I suggested it to her, it couldn’t be, she’s not capable of such meanness, she would never forgive herself. It was not at all difficult to prove to her that her own statements did not allow for a different interpretation; but the resistance lasted long enough, until my two comforting arguments - that, they say, cannot be responsible for my feelings and that her illness itself is a convincing evidence of her moral purity - did not have the proper effect on her.

Now I had to look for a variety of ways in order to reassure the patient. First of all, I wanted to give her the opportunity by reacting to get rid of the excitement accumulated over a long time. We examined her first impressions of her acquaintance with her son-in-law, the path of the birth of an unconscious feeling of love. Here, all the minor events were revealed, which, if you look back, were the harbingers of a quite mature passion...” [9. S. 93-96].

Moving along the groped path, i.e. letting the patient remember, realize and survive the traumatic situation, in this case, a suppressed love for her son-in-law, Freud claims that he was able to gradually achieve almost complete cure for his patient.

How does Freud understand what a “traumatic” situation is? From his point of view, this is a conflict of unconscious and unreacted opposing feelings (usually such as love for a loved one and an experience of duty, responsibility, etc.), leading to the isolation of “intolerable ideas”.

Perhaps, from the case under consideration (Elizabeth did not succumb to hypnosis), Freud’s dislike of hypnosis went, which he sees as a “capricious and mystical remedy”. Therefore, Freud is trying to find other ways to provoke the patient to be aware of his experiences. He draws attention to Bernheim’s assertion that there is a definite residual relationship between hypnotic and waking states. Taking this idea, Freud is looking for techniques to detect “key statements” that indicate psychotrauma in patients awake. The case pushes him to the method of “free association”. Freud began to demand that patients, in response to a word, freely produce any other words that came to their mind, “no matter how strange these associations may seem to them.” At the same time, Freud describes the phenomenon of “resistance,” that is, the patient’s reluctance to recall or be aware of the scenes and conflicts that led to mental trauma.

Deepening his understanding of what happened to this person, Freud paints such a picture. If the “suppressed” (“pinched”, “opposite”) affect does not find a normal, natural way out (cannot be realized), it is delayed, leading to “sources of constant excitement” or “movement into unusual bodily innervations” (somatic lesions). Similar states of the psyche, when the conditions for the normal exit of affects are violated and their delay, pinching occurs, Freud calls “hypnoid” states of the soul, since a person does not know anything about the true sources of trauma. Patients’ awareness of their own traumatic experiences (catharsis) is considered in this case as a force releasing “suppressed”, “pinched” affects.

“Thanks to the study of hypnotic phenomena,” Freud writes, “we are accustomed to that understanding, which at first seemed extremely alien to us, namely, that in the same individual several spiritual groups are possible that can exist in one individual quite independently from each other, may not know anything about each other and which, changing consciousness, come off one from another. If with such a split personality, consciousness is constantly inherent in one of the personalities, then this latter is called a conscious state of mind, and a person separated from it is called unconscious... we have a great example of the influence that a conscious state can experience from the unconscious” [10. S. 17].

How can one categorically interpret this and the previous narrative? On the one hand, these are clearly schemes (let’s call them “psycho-technical”, since they were obtained as a result of the objectification and schematization of the psychotherapeutic procedures that Freud felt when communicating with his patients). For example, Freud introduces the phenomenon of resistance into the psyche to explain and justify his behavior. Elizabeth resists, says that they are told that which cannot be, and Freud overcomes her resistance and convinces his patient that everything is really so, as he says. It turns out that Freud’s “resistance” is a theoretical understanding of his own practice and beliefs. He interprets the resistance of Elizabeth using a scheme where the introduction into the general field of consciousness of an isolated area of consciousness (the second, so to speak, unconscious person) involves overcoming the forces and energy spent on the process of isolation. It is clear that with a different conceptualization, for example, according to C. Rogers, the resistance could be interpreted in a completely different way, for example, as refusing to accept the wrong interpretation (by the way, that was exactly Elizabeth’s first reaction) or as reluctance to restore the integrity of the personality’s experience, or discuss with stranger personal problems.

On the other hand, the analyzed narratives are ideal objects, because with their help Freud seeks to understand how the psyche works; from the standpoint of a natural scientific explanation, he seeks unique causes for Elizabeth’s disease, resorts to rational ideas, the main of which are the physically interpreted ideas of the struggle of opposite drives, the splitting of personality and consciousness, the loss of one of the areas of consciousness from the general field.






Figure 1

At the next stage, Freud builds his first theory of the psyche, containing three instances (conscious, preconscious and unconscious). According to F. Vasilyuk, this is an ontology. One can agree with this, the ideas given by this theory are divorced from empirical material and are related to a special reality - the human psyche as such. And the elements (instances) of the psyche and their connection (the conflict of the conscious and the unconscious, the relation of repression, as well as the exit of repressed structures into consciousness) are, on the one hand, constructive, on the other hand, diagrams in relation to facts, on the third hand, they satisfy logical criteria (the requirement of consistency and scientific explanation, of course, as Freud himself understands them). However, why was Freud not satisfied with individual psychotechnical schemes and ideal objects?

Firstly, he tried to determine the nature of “pinched” affects (“torn off” mental groups) in order to know what signs of the patient’s behavior or his statements the psychotherapist should be guided to make the correct diagnosis and further treatment. Secondly, Freud sought to create an explanation of all the phenomena he observed according to a natural-scientific model: to build an ideal object and completely imitate the functioning and behavior of the object on it, that is, to explain according to the logic of the constructed mechanism all the phenomena observed in psychotherapeutic practice. This attitude of Freud was completely analogous to that which P. Ya. Halperin formulated in the Introduction to Psychology in the 70s. He believed that science does not study phenomena, but what lies behind them and makes up their essence - the mechanisms of psychological phenomena.

Apparently, the central idea laid by Freud at the foundation of such a mechanism was the idea of independent conflicting personalities (spiritual groups) interacting in a person, which in the new scheme turn into opposite instances of the psyche. The second consideration was obtained by crossing the idea of catharsis and the fact of resistance. Freud comes to the conclusion that if a certain experience (mental grouping) is not experienced (not reacted), since it contradicts the cultural norms of consciousness, it leaves consciousness, is forgotten and at the same time interferes with current mental activity. To eliminate this obstacle (to remove mental trauma), it is necessary in some form to experience such an experience, to conduct through consciousness. The idea of a conflict between culture and society, one person in a person with another was partly constructive, partly empirical. Combining and objectifying all these representations and ideas, Freud introduces the concepts of the unconscious and censorship (it was provided by the preconscious instance), as well as the idea of repression.

What is “unconscious” at this stage of building an ideal object? On the one hand, it is a region of the psyche where a “pinched” (crowded out) person acts, about which the person himself knows nothing, which he does not realize; it was with this strange “personality” that Breuer and Freud dealt when they introduced the patient into hypnosis and asked him about the initial trauma. On the other hand, the unconscious is the same personality (spiritual grouping) in conflict with another personality (it is identified with the ordinary consciousness) and at the same time aspiring to it, because only in this way can it realize itself.

The interpretation of the instances of the psyche not only as components, subsystems, and special forces (the desire for realization, prohibition, repression), but also as independent individuals, allowed Freud to consider the relevant contents of the instances as special statements, texts. In this regard, all psychic phenomena received in Freud’s theoretical construction received a double interpretation: as special conflicting forces and entities (desires, drives) and as thoughts, statements that needed to be adequately understood and deciphered. The last moment was determined by the action of censorship: Freud assumed that the unconscious as a person, in order to realize himself, is forced to cunning, mask his true thoughts and desires. Therefore, breaking into consciousness (when the effect of censorship weakens), the unconscious realizes itself, so to speak, in the form of other being: it expresses itself in the Aesopian language; in terms of the phenomenal, it appears in consciousness as another phenomenon that does not resemble itself. In “Psychology of Sleep,” Freud writes that the closest hidden thoughts found through analysis amaze us with their unusual appearance: they are not in sober verbal forms that our thinking usually uses, but rather through comparisons and metaphors.

Such a formulation of the question is purely humanitarian. It involves the communication of the researcher with the studied object, the need to understand this object, the possibility of introducing one’s own understanding and reflection into the studied object, etc.

We note that at this stage of constructing the ideal object, any repressed desires and drives could be unconscious in content, so long as they satisfy the requirement of conflict and consciousness can be interpreted as a condition for the realization of the unconscious. The definition and decoding of unconscious drives depended primarily on the art of the psychotherapist. He had to sort through and analyze a large number of cases from the patient’s life before he managed to find the situation that caused the mental disorder. At the same time, the doctor could not be sure until the end that the link he had found was just the one that would allow him to stretch the entire chain of the patient’s subsequent disturbances in the psyche and body. Not least, because the patients resisted, they denied Freud’s explanations.

Then Freud takes a series of cardinal steps. To remove the ambiguity and uncertainty in the search for unconscious structures (repressed desires, drives), he ascribes to these structures a strictly defined meaning, namely, treats them as sexual drives (instincts). The choice of sexuality as the meaning of the unconscious was partly random (Charcot’s hint), and partly, indeed, provided a solution to the problem. First, sexuality was easily interpreted energetically, thus the ideal object (psyche) found its place in nature, understood physically. Secondly, sexuality could be interpreted in value and cultural terms (as drives that come into conflict with cultural norms), that is, attributed to nature, already understood by culture. Thirdly, Freud received a clear rule of deciphering (interpreting) the phenomena of consciousness he was interested in: hysteria, dreams, descriptions, humor, etc. They now had to be reduced to sexual drives repressed into the unconscious.

Truly brilliant was the idea of referring all psycho-injuries to childhood. As you know, Freud claims that the main mental problems in a person arise precisely in this period. Having accepted this explanation, patients to a large extent stop resisting, because they did not remember what was in childhood. Finally, attributing the meaning of complexes (Oedipus, Electra) to psychic conflicts, Freud closes the construction of the psyche as a mechanism.

All of this work can be considered, on the one hand, as a simplification of the idea of the psyche and on the other hand, as the construction of a special ideal object that satisfies mechanical concepts. If Freud thought like Galileo, the next step would be to set up an experiment to establish the correspondence of the psyche as an ideal object with the real human psyche. However, Freud, in spite of his physicalist worldview, thinks in this case rather in a humanitarian way, where such a correspondence is established not in an experiment, but immediately in the starting point of the study due to the value relation. Freud from the very beginning proceeds from the concept of a conflict between a person and society and partially between a doctor and a patient (the phenomenon of resistance); he creates such interpretations of the phenomena of the patient’s consciousness and leads him to realize his problems along such a path that fully corresponds to Freud’s ideas about the structure of the psyche given to him. It turns out that theoretical ideas support and guide practice and practice - theoretical ideas.



And one more very important conclusion following from the analysis of this case. Freud’s construction of schemes and ideal objects is determined not only by the problems that he formulates and tries to solve, but also in the broad sense of the “methodology of work” (its installation, at the same time, in practice and cognition, by natural scientific convictions, by a scientific compromise, when he resorts to humanitarian forms of work, using psychotechnical schemes to build ideal objects and the latter to build new schemes).




Figure 2

Now we can discuss the issue of the epistemological nature of psychological constructions. It is advisable to talk about two criteria of truth: internal and external. First, the internal criterion. Whereas for Plato, the truth of philosophical constructions was set by ideas, for Aristotle, “the beginning” (as the starting point of reasoning and the essence of the phenomenon), for Newton and Kant, the concept of “law”, then for psychologists this is probably a problem situation and methodology of work. From this point of view, the internal criteria of truth for different areas of psychology (natural science, humanitarian, psychotechnical, etc.) will be different.

The external truth criterion is set using circuits. If the schemes taken from the psychological theory turn out to be attractive to a certain user (audience, population), then by the external criterion they are true. Another option is the ability to “put on the user” schemes, creating “practices of imputation”. There is no need to follow examples here; most psychological practices, starting with psychoanalysis, are as follows.

Finally, we think of the third case, “evolutionary”. Over time, certain schemes and theories related to them leave the stage of history (this, however, does not mean that under some conditions they cannot come to life again).

Common to all areas of psychology will be the dialectic of schematization and construction of ideal objects. Only in the case of academic psychology is the influence of practice on scientific knowledge not realized, although it really always takes place. In the case of purely practical disciplines, the roll is in the opposite direction: the important role of cognition embedded in psychological practice is not recognized. Within the framework of the psychotechnical approach developed by F. Vasilyuk, both parts of the psychological work - designing schemes and creating ideal objects find their organic place.

By the way, what F. Vasilyuk calls the central category (activity, unconscious, installation, experience, etc.) is not so much an ontological construction as an “ontological key” for methodological work. Indeed, it is difficult in the general case (irrespective of specific theories) to indicate the properties that the central category defines, but, as a rule, it is not difficult to characterize the methods and approaches associated with it.

Finally, what is the difference between “academic psychological theories” and “non-academic”, “practical”. The former were created within the framework of psychological science, with a leading cognitive attitude; the influence of practical requirements and quasi-

schemes in academic psychology is not actually realized. These theories were developed by studying ideal objects and reducing more complex cases to those already studied.

When creating practical theories, on the contrary, practical requirements and quasi-circuits act as the leading installation. The value of ideal objects and studies is understood in those psychological schools in which a fairly high culture of thinking has developed.

I will complete. I am inclined to the statement that the psychologist not only studies a person in science, but also constitutes him, helps him to become a person, to change, to develop. In form, such a constitution is often a symbolic description of a person's experience, the creation of such knowledge about a person that is simultaneously an event for him. In this sense, psychological knowledge is at the same time involving a person in a certain being. The central role in this process is played by the schemes created by the psychologist.

But do not forget that a psychologist can promote not only spirituality, but also anti-spirituality, not free up a place for a person for his life and development, but close the path for his spiritual growth, for freedom. Perhaps then we are dealing not with psychology, but with pseudo-psychology? But how to distinguish one from the other?

I think psychology is on the verge of a new stage in its development; Psychology is now characterized by an orientation toward several different ideals of scientific knowledge, a general shift in knowledge to the field of ideals of the humanities, and the creation of psychological practices. Some programs for building psychology have exhausted themselves, while others are only taking shape. In all cases, modern psychological knowledge and cognition should be methodologically equipped, dialogical, respond to the living problems of the time, contribute to the spiritual growth of a person, a better understanding of himself.

F.M. Dostoevsky said that man is a mystery, but it's not a pity to spend a whole life solving this mystery. If a person is just a special object of the first nature, even if such an object is more complex than the solar system or galaxy, then sooner or later the mystery of a person will be unraveled, and his behavior will be described no less strictly than the movement of the planets in the solar system. If it is just a complex psychic mechanism, even if only the tip of the iceberg is visible to us on the surface (in consciousness), and the rest of it goes unconscious, then sooner or later the new Freud will finally solve the mystery of man. In this case, the human psyche will be completely transparent for scientists, and its behavior can be calculated and predicted in the same way as today we calculate the eclipse of the sun and moon or the reliability of machines.

Fortunately (or for someone unfortunately), a person is not an object of the first nature, his psyche is constantly changing and evolving. It changes with the change of cultures, as well as under the influence of psychotechnics. The range of different psychotechnologies is very wide, starting from psychotherapy and education, ending with spiritual improvement of the person himself or esoteric practice. In this sense, the mystery of a person is constantly changing and eludes a psychologist.

But the psychologist has a noble and responsible field: he not only studies a person, trying to solve his secret, the psychologist participates (along with a philosopher, artist, teacher, but in a slightly different way) in the formation of a new person, a person who is born again and again. Therefore, psychology has little resemblance to the natural sciences, it is closer to the humanities, but maybe psychology shows us a very special case - the science of a new, yet unknown type. Indeed, in addition to scientific knowledge in psychology, symbolic descriptions and peculiar design knowledge are created. Moreover, the relationship between science and practice is unusual here: science directly goes into practice, and vice versa.

Considering that psychological theories and schemes are partial and often inadequate, it is very difficult to understand which case the psychologist is dealing with, that even if such an understanding exists, it is just a hypothesis and interpretation, given all this, it can be argued that actions practice psychologists should be very careful and constantly adjusted based on the results of psychological assistance

and the gradual clarification of the case itself. In this regard, the formula for the action of a psychologist can be defined as follows: maximum reflection and culture of thinking, maximum caution, maximum responsibility.

### Conclusion

In my opinion, the psychologist must constantly ask himself questions like: what is he really doing, are his actions adequate from the point of view of this case, could he understand what kind of case he is dealing with, has he taken into account the client's concept, whether he uses psychological help for ethically unjustified purposes, how to make sure that the strategy of psychological help he has chosen is correct and effective, etc.

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