

## Could Psychology become One of the Anthropological Disciplines?

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### Abstract

The article analyzes the features of traditional psychology and anthropology. A comparison of their approaches and principles allows us to state that traditional psychology and anthropology solve different problems and the methods of the second cannot be used in the first. However, the development of psychology creates opportunities for the convergence of these disciplines. Two examples of such convergence - the anthropological version of the psychological study of the ancient economy and the features of tea consumption in Victorian England - are discussed in the second part of the article.

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Perhaps this formulation of the question will outrage a psychologist who claims to be a scientific study of man and his behavior. But why not? Did Emanuel Kant, who declared the need to create anthropology, had in mind a scientific discipline, including one very similar to psychology? Kant's last book, published in 1798, was called *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. In it, the great German philosopher argues that anthropology is a systematic doctrine of man, which is considered from two points of view: "Physiological human studies means the study of what nature makes of man, and pragmatic study means that he is a freely acting creature, makes or can and must make of himself" [4. S. 351]. Is not it true that physiological human science actually coincides with the doctrine of psychological mechanisms, and pragmatic - with the psychology of personality. And here is what our famous theorist of anthropology Orlova Elna Aleksandrovna writes. "And when today psychologists and sociologists talk about the convergence of their sciences with anthropologies, we can talk not so much about borrowing the latter from the first two, but about the fact that they acquire anthropological coloring... The successes of cognitive psychology and a return to the topic of the so-called personality development also to a large extent, the placement of the corresponding phenomena in a sociocultural context, to which special attention was paid exclusively within the framework of social and cultural anthropology, contributed to this" [10. S. 5].

E. Orlova is expressed cautiously - "anthropological coloring", but I will express myself more definitely for the controversy. Are not anthropology and other human sciences (biology, genetics, ethnology, history, etc.) a challenge for psychology at present, since they have acquired knowledge about a person and patterns that significantly overlap psychological ones? It is clear that in order to reveal the meaning of this call or to refute it, it is necessary to discuss from the point of view of interest to us what psychology and anthropology are, and what is their comparative specificity.

Let's start with psychology. The program for the scientific study of man, as well as his interpretation, as though included in social relations and culture, but a relatively independent object of cognition, determined the following features of the psychological approach to

man. To explain the behavior and activities of a person, a psychologist is interested in how a person works, what is his mental mechanism; the scientific description of this mechanism itself is what is called the psyche.

“Science,” writes P. Ya. Galperin, “does not, in fact, study phenomena, but what lies behind them and produces them, which constitutes the “essence” of these phenomena, their mechanisms... There is another aspect of the question of the subject of psychology, which immediately reveals its vital practical significance and not “in general”, but for any psychological research, not only theoretical, but also practical. This is a question of what constitutes the mechanisms of psychological phenomena and where these mechanisms should be sought. It is clear that, only knowing these mechanisms, one can master the subject to a greater extent than experience and practice not armed with theory allow; it is also clear that any psychological research should be aimed at studying the mechanism of mental phenomena” [2. S. 9-10]. I think that humanitarian-oriented psychologists do not refuse to identify psychic mechanisms, only for them the mechanism does not come down to constructions like mechanical watches. Meaning for Frankl is also something like a psychic mechanism, only a mechanism for the individual and includes awareness and experience.

So, the analysis of mental mechanisms is the first feature of the psychological approach. Second: in psychology, the modern person is mainly analyzed and described. They may object to me, but what about the cultural-historical concept of L.S. Vygotsky, which many, especially Russian, psychologists swear, how is historical psychology? In my opinion, and I wrote about this, Vygotsky’s concept is more declared than developed, and historical psychology is only declared, but not created, by the way, because the historical approach to man contradicts the psychological understanding of man only as modern, more precisely as a person of the new European type. “The problems of historical psychology in Russian psychology of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we read in Psychology, edited by V.N. Druzhinin, were considered in the works of L. S. Vygotsky, S. L. Rubinshtein, A. R. Luria, B.D. Porshnev, L. I. Aciferova, O. M. Tutundzhyana, V. G. Ioffe, I. D. Rozhansky, etc. L. S. Vygotsky put forward the principle of cultural-historical determination of the psyche, which became one of grounds for building a new scientific discipline. A critical analysis of foreign schools of historical psychology (mainly French) was carried out. In the works of A. R. Luria, an attempt was made to empirically study the historical development of cognitive processes. Interesting studies concerning the formation of man and his psyche during anthropogenesis and the first stages of the historical development of society were conducted by B. D. Porshnev. However, these works were single and failed to ensure the creation of a special area of psychology - historical psychology. The empirical basis for research has been extremely limited. In fact, no serious steps have been taken from the declaration of the historical nature of mental processes to their concrete empirical study” [6].

Finally, the third feature of the psychological approach is the belief that a scientific explanation of a person can be obtained on the basis of their own psychological foundations (principles), without resorting to other non-psychological scientific disciplines. It seems, for example, that the experience of social psychology does not allow one to agree with this statement: here the psychologist refers to sociology, from which he takes a number of important points, for example, on the influence of “others” and communication. But an analysis of these provisions, say, in T. Shabutani’s “Social Psychology”, shows that these “others” and communication are not defined as sociological, but as psychological concepts, i.e. in the framework of psychological ontology (specifically, they specify the projections in the self-reality).

Now the features of the anthropological approach. They are not so easy to understand. On the one hand, anthropologists emphasize that at the center of their interest is a person who is considered in various humanitarian and social disciplines. On the other hand, it turns out that in anthropological study a person disappears, he is reduced to various de-individual realities: anthropological universals, culture, symbolic systems, social structures, communication, etc. In anthropology, E. Orlova writes, “a man in his living environment, both natural and created by himself, was and remains the center of study. Moreover, not only forms of organization were taken into account, but the content of the joint existence of people, determined by the nature of their activity, material and symbolic dimensions. This distinguishes anthropology from sociology, where the emphasis was on sustainable structures that support social solidarity, and mass social processes, and from psychology, where the subject area was composed primarily of intra-individual determinants of behavior” [10. S. 3].

Thinking through this situation, I come to the following two points. The first. Yes, indeed, anthropology, which various scholars write about, assumes an interdisciplinary and at the same time holistic approach, since an anthropologist, comprehending a person and his problems, on the one hand, turns to different scientific disciplines (sociology, cultural studies, psychology, semiotics and symbology, history etc.), on the other hand, it must take the various aspects of the phenomenon identified in this study in wholeness and unity. Second. The anthropological approach is a method of interdisciplinary mediation of the study of a person and his problems, i.e. an anthropologist, holding a person as a scale, problem, reality, goes to various other scientific disciplines, where he conducts research in order to obtain knowledge that allows returning to a new understanding and interpretation of man. In this sense, anthropology is not an ontology, but a methodology for interdisciplinary research of a person, which allows, while going to other disciplines, carrying out reduction in this regard, nevertheless, to maintain the anthropological dimension and obtain new knowledge about a person as a result.

Here, however, there is a serious problem: how to set and maintain the anthropological dimension (human problems, its scale, its reality) if a person himself in history changes (develops, evolves) and periodically dramatically (for example, when changing cultures or in social cataclysms and revolutions)? In my opinion, the solution consists in a joint analysis of the phenomenon and the reasons for studying this phenomenon. Here is a kind of hermeneutic circle. We need to conduct a double analysis: of the phenomenon that we take from the point of view of man, and of man himself. This method I call "distributed whole analysis". All parties that you analyze must be clarified during the analysis and all be rethought. Another thing is that you need focus. For example, I focus on, say, the study of science and take personality as its condition. But then I return to the personality, take it as a subject of research, but I already consider science as a condition for the formation of personality. Moreover, for different tasks, the number of these tricks and the tricks themselves are different. When solving problems, I feel for different tricks and a different number of them. In this regard, the whole is groped in the study itself. True, there are a number of principles that help shape this whole, for example, problematization. I begin my research with problematization, and it sets me a certain aspect of the whole. Further, there are research methods that I implement, for example, pseudogenetic reconstruction, etc. Thus, the work goes on in several "epistemic horizons" that define the whole. But not in advance, before research, the whole is manifested in the course of study, in the process of mental work. I identify and construct it, and it becomes in the space defined by these horizons.

Now we can discuss the question posed in the title of the article, namely, can psychology become one of the anthropological disciplines? I think that there is, in any case, traditional psychology. And that's why. Psychology deals with modern man, and in this sense is unhistorical, as Vygotsky wrote, and anthropology is with man in history. However, initially she generally studied only a person of archaic culture, but now she has switched to modern. The psychologist tries to explain human behavior based on his own psychological principles, without resorting to the help of other disciplines, and the anthropologist, on the contrary, is oriented interdisciplinary from the very beginning. The psychologist, like the hero of the novel *Viy*, tries to outline a person with a magic line so that no alien forces break into him, and the anthropologist, on the contrary, erases this line, revealing the essence of man to all interdisciplinary winds.

But in this case we are talking about traditional psychology. However, psychology does not stand still, it is also changing. In particular, turns to the same anthropology. For example, there is such a new psychological discipline - economic psychology. God himself told her to go towards anthropology, especially if economic relations in the ancient world are being investigated. I'll try to show it.

### Anthropological version of the psychological study of the ancient economy

There is a large, mainly Western, literature devoted to the analysis of forms of ownership of the ancient world ("supreme ownership of the king", property and possessions of the community, property relations in the family), as well as the first economic relations (market, wage labor, usurious capital, trade associations). But what do the authors mean by the economy and the economy, especially when it comes to the ancient world? In my opinion, the need for the emergence of an economy in the "culture of ancient kingdoms" was due to the

processes of the formation of managed collective labor (ancient Egypt and Sumer are most indicative here), which also suggests its division [12, p. 133-142]. That is, in order to advance in understanding, we must turn to cultural studies and management theory.

Indeed, until, for example, an army was created in Egypt, large collectives working under the supervision of thousands of scribes, problems that arose in administration, in the royal court, churches, production, distribution of labor and food products, were traditionally resolved and did not require special organization. With the advent of all this, economic activity became absolutely necessary, because, say, to feed and clothe tens of thousands of people who do not work in the field and in the household (so that they effectively manage, send a cult, fight) is impossible in the traditional way. In this case, production is necessary that provides not only the producer himself, but also many other people, the distribution of labor products is necessary, based on the needs of the whole and its parts, and not the producer himself. It is economic activity that solves all these problems.

Tsarist scribes and priests begin to improve production (to innovate, organize it), to redistribute the products of labor, trying to provide them with all social institutions and spheres of society, to ensure that production functions efficiently and without interruption.

It must be taken into account that production in the broad sense is not only the manufacture of things and tools (weapons), but also military affairs (its products are military booty and tribute, as well as the confidence and security of the country's inhabitants) and, so to speak, "spiritual production", which allowed to communicate with the gods and receive help from them, and the sphere of management. But this is only one aspect of the economy - artificial, because it involves goal-setting from a person (what exactly needs to be done to...), as well as planning and decision-making. An example of the first is the target setting for the creation of irrigation structures (canals, dams) in the kingdoms of the ancient world, the second is the preparation of grain reserves in case of drought or crop failure.

The need for economic activity is also dictated by the rapid development in the ancient world of trade. The division of labor and the unification in the same kingdom of various nomes and provinces, with different conditions and traditions of agriculture and crafts, and therefore producing different products, contributes to the development of domestic trade, which in turn forces us to plan production and increase productivity, redistribute the produced product, that is, to create a farm.

The second aspect of the ancient economy can be called natural, it is associated with what can conditionally be called "the economy of the culture of the ancient kingdoms". To understand what it is, for example, compare the economic activities of the Ancient and Middle Kingdom in Egypt. In the first case - this is primarily the power decisions of the Pharaoh's officials in the field of production and distribution. In the Middle Kingdom, when various independent entities (king, priests, nobles) took shape, economic activity is mediated, on the one hand, by agreements and agreements concluded between these entities, and, on the other, by a special understanding of property and property (these two points form the essence ancient "economy").

We take into account this circumstance. For a person, the culture of the ancient kingdoms, although he exchanges his product on the market, or leaves an inheritance, the alienated property or goods in a sense are inalienable, since they are a continuation of the person himself (for example, the terms "own" and "property" in Egypt are recognized by the same sign "Dt" as "flesh", "torso" [11]). Property and a product created by man were not only a condition for his existence, but, consequently, life, but also had a soul that was closely connected with man or the gods who participated with man in his creation. We give two examples.

Analyzing the concept of "d.t." widely used in the Old Kingdom, which means, with the addition of other words, the economy ("d.t. house"), people, animals, villages, buildings, establishments, etc., Y. Perepelkin writes the following. "So, we see that in the pyramids, using the word d.t., not only physical affiliation and kinship were expressed, but also affiliation by virtue of possession. We also saw that the inscriptions of private individuals used dT to indicate ownership by the right of ownership - a great many examples were cited - and at the same time used the same word when they wanted to express belonging due to kinship, personal connection, purpose, use, initiations!" [eleven. S. 118-119].

Before us is a vivid example of the anthropological method of “mediation.” Perepelkin uses the anthropological dimension - bodily, generic, individual units - to highlight and characterize ownership and economy.

In that era of market exchange, in order to disconnect property or a manufactured product from itself, it is not enough to exchange it for others that are equivalent in terms of labor and time. It is also necessary to appease, firstly, their gods, making sacrifices to them, secondly, members of the community to which a person belongs, thirdly, alien gods and the community, so that they take the property of others and the product into their possession. All these points, for example, can be seen on the material of the Sumero-Babylonian culture.

“Texts in which this or that type of transfer of property is fixed (purchase and sale, deprivation of inheritance, slavery, freeing slaves, etc.)” writes I.S. Klochkov, replete with special terms and formulas that indicate the rites that accompanied these actions... with all the development of commercial activity in ancient Mesopotamia, property, things did not turn into bare consumer or exchange value, into purely economic values; they did not “tear themselves away” completely from their owners, did not become neutral objects, which Justinian laws and modern law consider them to be. This circumstance most directly affected the economic sphere, largely determining the functioning of the ancient exchange mechanism... the buyer had to give the former owner three types of compensation for the assigned object. First of all, he paid immediately or in parts the “purchase price” (nig-sa), usually with grain or copper. J. Bottero, implies equivalence, the balance of two values. Then the buyer gave a “surcharge” (nig-giri or is-gana = nig-ki-gar - “what is put on the ground”), calculated in the same “money” as the “purchase price”, i.e. grain or metals. In the texts from Farah, this “surcharge” is equal to the price and even more than it...

The “surcharge” was both mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory because the sheer “price” of the thing alone could not satisfy the seller: things in the ordinary mind were considered invaluable, not reducible to any equivalent. It is voluntary because the size was set by the buyer (possibly by agreement with the seller), based on his assessment of the degree of the seller’s attachment to his good, the strength of his own desire to acquire this object and, probably, the desire to show his generosity and demonstrate his greatness.

This last desire explains the third type of payment - “gifts” (nig-ba, literally “what is given”). In contrast to “price” and “surcharge”, “gifts” usually did not consist of grain or metals, but expensive things (clothes, weapons, etc.), food and drink... The main seller received the best “gift”, other gifts - his immediate environment (neighbors and relatives who could be co-owners), as well as a scribe and officials who fastened the deal; refreshments were arranged for all parties to the transaction, including witnesses...

A man, in the words of J. Bottero, is not so much in the matter of things as good, intended for ordinary use and consumption, but on the basis of everything and everything made up his personality. And during the exchange, these things were more likely not objects of purchase, but objects of “conquest”, “conquest”; hence the exorbitant generosity (a kind of duel between the seller and the buyer)” [5. S. 52-53].

Thinking through this practice, we can assume that a phenomenon that looks to us like the economy of the ancient world, in modern scientific discourse, can be interpreted as the cultural and anthropological conditionality of economic activity. Indeed, in modern Western culture, for example, land is freely bought and sold, and they are sued for malicious defaulters. In the culture of ancient kingdoms (by the way, as is sometimes the case in modern Russia), land in the usual sense was not sold, and debts were often forgiven. “The connection between the land and the owner (individual or collective),” writes Klochkov, “was very strong. In the II millennium BC. e. and later, on the periphery of Mesopotamia, land ownership remained the exclusive right of the community collective; alienation of land outside the community or circle of blood-related relatives was impossible. In such cases, land could only be acquired in one way: to become a member of a given community or family; hence the incredible spread of “receptions in brothers”, “adoptions”, etc.... Apparently, the institute misarum was also connected with the idea of “principled” inalienability of the hereditary allotment of land or house. In the first half of the II millennium BC. e. as in the older era, some Mesopotamian rulers from time to time declared “Justice” (Misharum) - that is, they issued special decrees by which certain debts were forgiven and the lands, gardens and houses sold (obviously in extreme circumstances) were returned free of charge to the former to the owners” [5. S. 50-51].

It is clear that Misharum, admission to brothers or adoptions should be attributed to acts of economic activity (since persons denounced by competence should have taken an appropriate decision), but the same acts can be considered to be related to the ancient economy; with their help, economic activity was mediated by prevailing cultural and anthropological customs. Just as the price of the goods included the sacred connection of the owner with this thing, the price of land included its relations with its owner and the community, which in the case of Misharum allowed the land, houses and gardens to even return to their owners.

If we talk about the Middle Ages, then here the manufactured goods were not completely alienated from their producers. Yes, this process went back to ancient culture, when the concept of ownership, as the right of ownership, was formed. In Rome, property is understood as the power of the producer over things, i.e. purely anthropologically. "For possession in the legal sense," writes IB Novitsky, "the will to possess a thing was necessary, not recognizing the authority of another person over itself, the will to treat a thing as its own" (emphasized by me. - VR) [9. P.76].

In ancient philosophy, for the first time, we also discuss what we attribute to the economy and the economy. In particular, Aristotle distinguishes between two types of wealth: necessary for a normal life of a person, community and state, and also infinitely expandable, which has become an end in itself. Aristotle assesses the latter type of wealth negatively as "contrary to nature," since money and property are not used in this case for their intended purpose; for example, in the case of usury "banknotes lose their purpose for which they were created: after all, they arose for the sake of exchange trade, the collection of interest leads precisely to the growth of money" [1. S. 395]. Distinguishing between the two types of wealth, Aristotle brilliantly sees two future (new European) understanding of the economy. One, if one may say so, is "organismic" and partly anthropological: the economy is a balance of life needs (needs) and products and services produced in the economy (in the language of the market - the balance of supply and demand). The second understanding can be called technological: the economy is a special technique of management, accumulation and market exchange that allows you to accumulate wealth infinitely ("it becomes infinite as a result of trade, usury and other technical types of experience"). It is interesting that Stagirite guesses: wealth (economy) in the second sense (market exchange enriching a person or a state, monopoly, etc.), on the one hand, creates new opportunities for the development of the economy, but, on the other hand, is socially destructive ("disgusting nature").

Nevertheless, in antiquity, and in the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance, when a person produced things, he did not consider himself doing these things. God was the creator, the master only imitated him, revealing (manifesting) in the material already existing in the divine "nomenclature" of form and essence. Moreover, since in the Middle Ages it was believed that God not only created things, but also abides in them, telling things to life, every thing in medieval culture was understood simultaneously as a subject. The thing-subject could not yet freely set off into all the hardships of market relations, it was still quite tightly tied with both God and the person who helped her find her own "voice" [8].

Not so in the Renaissance, when a person borrows divine prerogatives and begins to think that he does things. This new look at a person who creates independently, without the participation of God, contributes to the fact that the things he produces begin to be understood only as his personal property. And when Galileo and Huygens showed how it is really possible to create "new natures" within engineering activities, that is, mechanisms and machines that act according to the laws of nature (in fact, they were completely perceived as creations of nature by man), this view of things is gradually accepted as the main. Which, in turn, contributes to the formation of the belief that a thing (product) produced (created) by a person, firstly, is in his full power (will), and secondly, it was created specifically for exchange on the market.

"In order for these things," writes Marx, thinking practically as an anthropologist, "could relate to each other as goods, commodity owners should relate to each other as persons whose will dwells in these things; thus, one commodity owner only by the will of the other, therefore, each of them, only through one common willful act common to both of them, can appropriate another's goods to himself, alienating his own. Consequently, they must recognize each other as private owners... The owner seeks to alienate his goods in exchange for



others whose consumer value he needs. All products have no consumer value for their owners and represent consumer value for their non-owners. Therefore, they must constantly move from hand to hand" [7. S. 41, 42].

My statement that Aristotle's second understanding of economics allows it to be interpreted as social technology does not mean that, in the first sense, economics is not technology. Naturally, this is also a technology, but another, working for a social organism, on the balance of supply and demand. In addition, the economy in the second sense is technology (management strategies, market exchanges, monopolies, currency schemes, etc.), so to speak, living on its own and for its own sake. Even the principle of superprofits for her is not external, but internal. Yes, this technology emerged from the bowels of an economy working for a social organism (state, society, family), but it broke away from this organism and began to live an independent life.

In the twentieth century, it becomes clear that the invention of new technologies is one of the causes of economic crises and, more broadly, the crisis of social institutions. They talk about the unexpectedness of the economic crisis of past years, they even use such a metaphor "soap bubble", which arose unclearly, by itself. But is it, of course, natural? Didn't the crisis precede completely clear and, it seemed, scientifically substantiated steps: liberalization of the economy, a certain tax policy, new forms of lending, lending to risks, the resale of "bad" debts and other socio-economic actions that spawned Mont Blanc virtual money, upset the economic balance, undermined consumer confidence in financial and other economic institutions.

The question is, what did social theorists not take into account? A lot of things, including anthropological factors. For example, the negative consequences of introducing new technologies and financial instruments were not thought out, they did not take into account the ingenuity of citizens who constantly come up with schemes that allow them to live beyond their means (and this is also technology), they did not take into account the role of criticism of the existing economic system, as well as changes in consumer consciousness, up to before the landslide processes of an almost instantaneous spread of mistrust. Just one example - the invention and production of virtual money using credit cards and various currency schemes.

### Features of tea consumption in Victorian England as an example of anthropological conditionality of the economy

Technology is not born at the same time, like Athena Pallas got out of Zeus's head. They take shape, and at different times in connection with emerging requests, and most importantly, the possibilities of satisfying them. Both that (requests and opportunities), as a rule, which is often not understood, are determined in anthropological and sociocultural terms. Therefore, by the way, the transfer of social technologies from one culture to another is often or even impossible or requires a change (reform) under the broadcast technology of sociality itself.

Economics is no exception. For it to form, a new sociocultural arrangement is needed, which takes dozens, and sometimes hundreds of years. This process of technology formation and its providing sociality I call "the process of social technologicalization" [13. S. 72-73].

The scheme of social technologization (the formulation of a social message, the formation of technology itself and the new forms of sociality that provide it) can also be used to analyze the formation of a certain type of economy. For an example, I will use the article by I. I. Rutsinsky, "Tea drinking in English painting of the Victorian era". In addition to painting, the author of the article shows how the mass demand for tea developed at that time. In particular, it turns out that this need was consciously formed and socially arranged with the help of various social practices: tea delivery from English colonies, industrial production of tea ware, advertising, art (painting). But let's listen to Rutsinsky herself.

"Throughout the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> and the whole of the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries," she writes, "tea for the inhabitants of Great Britain remained an expensive exotic drink, preserving its "alien"- eastern nature, its connection with a different, non-European culture. Together

with tea leaves, expensive Chinese porcelain, accessories, furniture were imported into the country. The tea table was ultimately a field of extremely intense Sino-English dialogue.

The British managed to get rid of the “eastern accent” of the tea ceremony only in the Victorian era. It was during the years of the uniquely long - sixty-four-year - period of the reign of Queen Victoria (1837 - 1903) that tea gained the status of a national drink.

This is due, first of all, to a change in the scale of its consumption, which was supported by the imperial ambitions of the state and the commercial interests of the growing strength of the bourgeoisie. Increasing supply volumes were provided by a number of targeted actions. These include ongoing diplomatic negotiations, and the so-called “Opium Wars,” and an unprecedented reduction in the tea tax, and the introduction of a law to limit the sale of alcoholic beverages and support the sale of tea, coffee, chocolate, and the creation of Indian and Ceylon tea plantations, and much another. As a result, tea became an affordable product that everyone drank in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: from members of the royal family to workers.

However, to determine the significance of the drink in the structure of the gastronomic identity of the people, not only quantitative indicators of its consumption are important. The mechanisms of assimilation of tea included the creation of a special - “truly English” - material and visual context of tea drinking, displacing any “eastern allusions” from this ceremony. Already in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, home-made porcelain appeared, as well as tea furniture, silver utensils. Their production in the following decades acquired a truly massive scale. In the Victorian era, there was a fashion for special tablecloths, napkins, even special dresses and suits for five o’clock. Tea feast has become an organic part of the English culture of everyday life.

The change in the external surroundings was accompanied by the formation of a specific English tea etiquette. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, books appeared regulating all aspects and details of the tea ceremony: how to make tea, how and where to serve it, whom to invite to tea, what to talk about at the table. It is significant that in the Victorian etiquette tradition, along with the rules of how to behave, prohibitive rules were prescribed in great detail: you can not sip tea from a cup in which a teaspoon is left; you cannot look at others when you take a sip; you can’t set your little finger up while holding a cup; ladies should not wipe their lips with a napkin; You cannot put a napkin on the table, leaving the tea table (only on a chair), etc. etc. The nuance of such prohibitions was extremely high and vividly reflected the views of British society about decency and - what especially worried the British - about indecent behavior.

The transition from ritual to etiquette, to the creation of a whole set of nationally determined rules of behavior at the tea table, marked a new stage in the civilizational appropriation of the drink, the completion of its “transcoding”.

In addition to the above, there was another mechanism of “embedding” tea in English culture: the creation of a stable visual formula for English tea drinking. Significant role in this process, as shown by an interesting study of the English author E. Beddoes, was played by advertising. National painting turned out to be no less “influential” <...>.

Perhaps, nowhere and never again has tea drinking attracted such close attention of artists as in the UK of the Victorian era. This topic was addressed by masters known and not very, metropolitan and provincial <...>.

According to the Dictionary of English Artists, more than 11 thousand painters worked in the Victorian era, most of which specialized in the everyday genre. Tens and hundreds of artists worked on the visualization of what was called the “English tea party”, helping to introduce the tea ritual as an integral part of British everyday life” [14].

Let us try, based on this material, to single out the anthropological and social conditions that ensure the formation of the need for tea. Firstly, this is a transition from elite tea drinking, characteristic of the 17<sup>th</sup> - 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, to a massive, democratic one in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, the need for modern technology, as the analysis shows, arises during the transition from a class society to a democratic, mass



society, within which every citizen seeks to receive the same services (in quality and cost) as others. Secondly, it is necessary for industrial (most often, machine) production to take shape, which is able to satisfy the mass demands and needs of a democratic society. In this case, it was the production of tea and all accessories related to tea drinking (dishes, furniture, etc.). Thirdly, a legal framework was created for the production of tea and a new pastime for the British, starting from the laws in force in the colonies, ending with the "introduction of the law to limit the sale of alcoholic beverages and support the sale of tea" in England itself. Fourth, it was necessary to develop numerous rules governing the process of tea drinking. They were already directly related to social technology, involving the breakdown of the social process into separate operations and providing their conditions. Fifthly, the formation of the process of mass consumption of tea would be supported by advertising, painting, literature. As a result, an English citizen gradually developed, for whom the need for tea and tea drinking became an integral character trait.

### Conclusion

The general conclusion that can be drawn is this: the economy is taking shape along with the anthropological and cultural conditions that provide it, which imply the conscious participation in this process of economic, economic and cultural entities. Economic psychology, naturally in the version that I have presented here, is certainly an anthropological discipline. As psychology, it sheds light on the nature of the economic person, as anthropology reveals this nature to us on the basis of appeals to various social and humanitarian disciplines.

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