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Review Article

Heidegger and Sciences: A Beginning for a Psychoanalytic Science

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Abstract

The article revises what Martin Heidegger (1889 - 1976) wrote in his work regarding the sciences, and seeks, from this, arguments that allow a scientific approach to psychoanalysis. It begins with Heidegger's criticism of western metaphysics and an explanation of its distinguishing features, then outlines some philosophical considerations of the sciences, in particular its criticism of scientific ontotheology. Finally, it reflects upon psychoanalysis and the fundamental characteristics of the sciences as proposed by philosophy.

Keywords: *Heidegger; Science; Psychoanalysis*

Introduction and Aim

The aim of this paper is to review what Martin Heidegger (1889 - 1976) wrote in his work on sciences and thus to find an argument that allows proposing the scientificity of psychoanalysis. This article will attempt to demonstrate that the philosopher's reflections provide elements for affirming the sciences in plural form, not reduced to a single term, and demonstrate that his thinking opens a broad perspective for the legitimation of other sciences that are not reduced to intelligibility and methods of the so-called natural sciences.

It will begin with his critique of Western metaphysics by explaining its distinguishing features, covering his considerations of the sciences and, in particular, his critique of scientific ontotheology, and concluding with a reflection on psychoanalysis and the fundamental characteristics of the sciences proposed by the philosopher in a course taught in Freiburg in the late 1920s.

Martin Heidegger is a controversial author and also recognized as one of the most important philosophers of his century. Neopragmatist Richard Rorty [1] considered Heidegger to be the greatest European thinker of his time, despite his Nazi past. For Alain Badiou [2], Heidegger is the key thinker of the twentieth century. Regarding his controversial adherence to Nazism, the French philosopher analyzed with Barbara Cassin the letters Heidegger wrote to his wife Gertrude, to conclude that Heidegger's political engagement was mediocre and circumstantial, contrary to his thinking. The verdict is simple: "(...) yes, Heidegger was a Nazi, not a first-rate Nazi; a banal Nazi, petty bourgeois provincial. Yes. Heidegger is without doubt one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century" ([2], p. 25).

Just to contextualize its evolution, it is said with Benedito Nunes [3] that Heidegger's thought begins with "Being and Time" and closes his first cycle in 1946 with the "Letter on Humanism" [4]. The third section planned for "Being and Time" titled "Time and Being" has not

been published. From it there is only the protocol of the conference pronounced in 1962. "Time and Being" was not published "because the thought failed to express sufficiently, a turning point in the language of metaphysics" (Heidegger, 1957, cited by Nunes [3], p. 12).

It would not be possible to make a census of everything the philosopher wrote or said about the sciences, but it is desired to focus on important considerations made at key moments of his production. If literal quotation is repeatedly used, it is because it is considered necessary to give the philosopher a voice/letter about how he expressed himself to better grasp what he said - and not just mention him about the way his thinking is secondarily referred to in general.

Heidegger's critique of metaphysics

In order to better understand Heidegger's thinking about the sciences, the philosopher's position on metaphysics, his effort to overcome it and his differentiation between being and entity, will be presented in general terms.

Metaphysics in Heidegger is any general orientation of thought that speaks of things situated beyond (goal) worldly realities (physis) and which occurs through two fundamental processes, which shall be seen in detail: the understanding of being and the subjectification of the being.

There is metaphysical thinking in every age of philosophy and culture in general. Inevitable to say that there is much metaphysics in popular culture and contemporary "enlightened" culture. Metaphysics in its Modern version would have been born of the late scholastic of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). According to Heidegger [5], the essence of Greek ontology has been transposed through Suarez's Disputationes Metaphysicae, into the metaphysics and transcendental philosophy of the Modern Age. Suárez would have identified the being of entity and being in general with a global concept of being: "communis conceptus entis" ("common concept of entity") which unfolds into numerous internal distinctions that also include the creator God and the created entity in the same system [6].

To all metaphysics, Heidegger will oppose his fundamental ontology and the first step taken is the "destruction" of the first. It is understood by "destruction" of metaphysics, not a derisive attitude in terms normally associated with that word, but which: Thus, it necessarily belongs to the interpretation of being and its structures, i.e. the reductive construction of being, a critical deconstruction of the traditional concepts that must be necessarily employed at first, with a view to the sources from which they are drawn. It is only through destruction that ontology can fully assure itself phenomenologically of the authenticity of its concepts ([7], p. 39).

The fundamental step of this "destruction" was to make the necessary distinction between being and entity. This is because the "being does not allow itself to be objectively represented and produced in the likeness of the entity" ([8], p. 69). The forgetfulness of this distinction is what guaranteed metaphysics, in its different conceptions - idea and emergeia in the Hellenic culture, the actualitas of the Roman scholastics, the modern cogito of Descartes, and finally, the ego volo, the will of the modern episteme - the subtraction or avoidance of the proper understanding of both [3].

What can be read about being and entity in Heidegger himself? "The entity is everything we talk about: it is everything we understand; how we behave this or that way; it is also what and how our very selves are" ([5], p. 32). Therefore, the entities are what is found in reality: a man, a house, a book, a tree, a planet, a drawing, etc. They are the very elements of Greek physis. To the Greeks, "physis as a whole was the realm of things subject to generation and corruption, perishable, multiple, changeable, contingent, finite, and limited" ([9], p. 1).

Among the entities, the human stands out for questioning and interpreting the being. "This entity that each one of us is, and has in his being, among others things, the possibility of questioning, is designated as presence ([5], p. 33)".

And as for being, Heidegger writes that it "is in what it is and how it is, in content and resource, in value and validity, in presence, in existence ([5], p. 32)." Later he will say that the being is "permanent (...), always equal to itself (...), given substrate (...), constant presence (...) ousia ([10], p. 290)".

And how in modern metaphysical and scientific discourses can one escape from the difference between being and entity (ontological difference) and remain in the oblivion and veiling of being? Through the entification of the being and the subjectivation of the being, which are intertwined processes of thought and they are outlined here by Heidegger: The comprehension of being (logos in a very broad sense) which previously illuminates and directs all behavior towards the entity, is neither a capture of being as such [for this would be to entify it] nor a reduction to the concept, the thus captured [which would mean subjectivizing the entity] ([11], p. 118; the words in brackets are by the authors).

The following quote should be noted and unfolded: The entification of the being (grasping the entity in a concept as a being) is any form of thought (individualized or collectivized in institutions) which, aiming at any referent, identifies it as "being" in the full sense of this word [9]. In other words, it is when the concept of a single entity and hence the entity itself (a stone, a woman, a scientific theory, and sometimes a concept itself) is attributed to the realization of the fullness of being, the realization of the condition of Perfect or Absolute (including giving her, as is often the case in these situations, a writing with an initial capital letter: The Matter, The Idea, The Science, The Woman). Thought and discourse fixate on that Absolute and thereafter disregard or belittle other aspects of the referent first, as well as consider only other entities in function of it, but without dwelling on it [9].

Important: This entification of "being" also implies, by reference to the Absolute, what Heidegger called the Onto-theology of Western thought. In such an operation, the entity is given the status given to the Being itself in its maximum power (God). "For, since Aristotle, the task of philosophy as metaphysics is to think of the entity as such, ontotheologically ([12], p. 105)." Modern science itself has become an ontotheology for Heidegger, as we shall see later.

The other characteristic feature of ancient metaphysics to which Heidegger opposes his fundamental ontology, a feature still present in contemporary times, is the subjectivation of the entity. This means reducing what has been captured from being to a concept. The aim is to identify any being with a concept that represents it from the perceptions one may have of it. These perceptions will lead to appointing it with the same concept, usually entifier. To the extent that it is subjectivized, a discourse made in this article is imposed on it and no longer gives it the opportunity to talk about itself, by itself. It acts to prevent it from showing any sign that it is singular.

The expression Heidegger uses ("reducing the so captured to the concept") means to subjectify the entity because the one who mentions the concept about another entity reduces it to his vision, his ideas or the concepts with which he works. He reduces it to his own subjectivity, since with Modernity "the self is understood as subject, while the term object is reserved for the designation of things or objects that have nothing to do with the self ([13], p. 143)." To subjectify an entity is to aim at something of it, to disprove it from all the other attributes it has, to highlight only one that attracts or interests us, and then name it and treat it from that attribute.

Example: if we have an experience of several interviews with someone in our office and if from there we resort to the diagnostic nomenclature (more as an anchor than as a compass) perhaps naming him as a narcissistic neurotic (melancholic) and always treating him as such (as "the" melancholy) without considering its uniqueness, we will incur a metaphysics. It is not exactly a mistake, but it is a secondary conception of its truth, since it is intended to remain in the particular of what would be considered its psychic structure (narcissistic neurosis) and not in its uniqueness of subject or falasser (speech).

Let us now turn to what Heidegger tells us about the sciences and what in modern science repeats itself as traces of metaphysics to be overcome.

Some considerations of Heidegger on sciences

In 1927, in his main work ("Being and Time"), Heidegger expresses his concern for the sciences and their place in the thought experience: "What are the conditions of possibility inherent in the ontological constitution of presence (dasein) and which are existentially necessary for presence to exist in the mode of scientific research?" ([14], p. 157).

Then he understood science as a mode of being-in-the-world that discovers and opens the entity and its being but warned that the existential interpretation of science is possible only if the nexus between "being" and "truth" is clarified. Heidegger stressed the primacy of vision in all scientific management. For him, the emphasis on vision was given from the earliest days of Greek ontology, passed through Kant, and continued until the beginning of his own century. Today there is also this prevalence of the look. In neuroscientific evaluations, the aim is to improve neuroimaging exams, "real-time" vision of neurotransmitter flow and impediments in a patient's brain, among others[1]. In the field of the treatment of psychic suffering, the Freudian listening (and some psychotherapeutic approaches) for the look supported by the technologies was largely exchanged.

The demonstration of the existential genesis of science will obey this primacy, considering the "circumvision" that guides all practical occupation in the sciences. "Circumvision" means, in Heidegger, to take an overall view of any "world" taken into account: "The construction of the daily world of occupations is not blind, but guided by an overall vision, the circumvision, which embraces the material, the user, the use, and the work, in all its orders" ([5], p. 314).

The "circumvision" itself will obey a "supervision", which consists in the primary understanding of conjunctural wholeness. Any reflection within the scientific procedure implies establishing conjunctural links. The importance of having an overall view appears when the author discusses the thematization of the being in a scientific project of nature.

And here it is important to open a paragraph to clarify that "nature" in Heidegger is not the being. Nature is an entity: "Nature itself is an encountering entity within the world that can be discovered by following different paths and degrees" ([5], p. 104). And yet: "Descartes distinguishes the ego cogito as res cogitans from res corpórea. This distinction will ontologically determine the later distinction between Nature and Spirit. (...) Descartes determined the being of these entities within what ontological understanding?" ([5], p. 135).

The demarcation of "regions of the being" characterizes the design of each science. Heidegger cites the example of the emergence of mathematical physics and states that the decisive thing is not in the observation of physical facts or in the application of mathematics to them, but in the very mathematical project of that entity, nature. Such a project discovers the "continuity" of the matter and enables its quantitative determination. The bottom line is that the project opens an a priori, and this a priori is the determinant of the consistency of that science [14].

The disappointment, criticism, and accusations of modern science, started in the course of 1935's "Introduction to Metaphysics", have continued over the following years. In the afterword to the lecture, entitled "What is metaphysics?" written in 1943, the philosopher says that the sciences make the same mistake as philosophies that must be overcome: they take entities as beings, and perform only one mode of calculating the objectivization of the entities. He also regrets that they do not even seek the truth anymore: "Modern science neither serves a purpose first proposed to it, nor does it seek a truth in itself" ([8], p. 67).

Over the years, disappointed criticism has given way to warning criticism. Modern science does not access essence itself because it does not think. "It does not think because, according to the manner of its procedure and its resources, it can never think" ([16], p. 115).

[1]According to M. Bassols [15], neurosciences believe in manipulating a real that has knowledge written in itself; knowledge not supposed, ready to be read. They seek to isolate the qualia that would be the subject's unique experience, such as the painful experience of pain.

Increasingly, modern science becomes the application of techniques, and "it always comes across and only meets what its mode of representation allows it in advance and leaves it as a possible object" ([17], p. 148).

The scientific onto-theology

Apparently, in the seminar "The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics" [18] the philosopher deals the hardest blow to traditional philosophy/metaphysics, and also to modern science in its metaphysics. The blow comes from the revelation that modern science, often self-declared as atheist, is based on the thinking of a philosopher, René Descartes, who attributes to God the human capacity to access and produce truths. The sciences would work in this way, and without realizing it, from a theological position, as it shall be seen below.

God has entered philosophy at all its times, yet remaining veiled in many of them. God entered precisely from the indecision as to the difference between being and entity (a difference that metaphysics has always avoided checking). In this article, one can say with Heidegger that indecision means the scope of philosophical thought and its consequences, in which the very question of what differentiates being from entity always remains open, that is, the scope in which the dynamic question of the occult advent (entity) and the non-concealed advent (being) is open. Escaping a deeper reflection on this theme, metaphysical philosophies chose to establish God as the original cause of entities, the cause of causes.

God enters philosophy by the decision we first think of as the atrium in which the difference between being and entity manifests. (...) The decision gives as a result and offers the being as an adductor and producer foundation, a foundation that itself needs, from what it bases, the adequate foundation, that is, the causation for the thing (cause) most originating (Ur - Sache). This is the cause as cause sui. This is how the proper name for God sounds in philosophy ([18], p. 199).

Why for Heidegger, as for many contemporaries, is modern science a theology and a new religion? Because, following the tradition on which it is founded, to hide the difference between being and entity, modern science preserves a typical trait of metaphysical thought that embodies a claim to the Absolute, a theological pretense. The trait is that already described above: the understanding of the being. Science takes the concepts that it makes of the entities with which it works for the being in its fullness, when it does not do it with the entities themselves. Taking them (entities and/or concepts) as the being at its maximum power, even if in a brief moment or in a series of moments from which the concept is gaining strength, the researchers see them as makers of an Absolute condition[2].

The consequence of operating in this way with the concepts and beings taken into consideration is that, by a kind of transitivity, the sciences themselves end up as realizers of that fullness or absoluteness.

The claim of the Absolute embedded (unconsciously?) In the scientific device of taking the entity for being and the being in its maximum power, eventually reached the scientific doing itself. Over time and the assumption of a dominant position in culture, the natural sciences (physics and biology and their derivatives) made a subliminal equalization of scientific and theological discourses. This movement took place through its propagandists and ideologues rather than through leading researchers themselves. For this, it was enough for the scientists to associate to the significant "science" other signifiers that directly or by metaphor and/or metonymy refer to terms that translate ideas normally used in religious and theological discourses (path/method, certainty, healing, salvation, revelation, etc).

[2]It does not seem to us to be a mere allegorical or metaphorical resource that the ideologues of the sciences have viralized the expression "God particle" to refer to the Higgs boson.

This modern story begins with a membership in Descartes. René Descartes (1596 - 1650) conflated the philosophical and scientific ontotheologies. The historical unfolding of philosophies, full of metaphysics and God, resulted in their philosophy and consequently in the propositions and practices that spawned the modern sciences. Two quotations will suffice to demonstrate how much these sciences (and in this case one might even use the expression 'modern science') are indebted to a thought whose logic is theological (it takes God as a referent and as a referential of what unfolds). That is, quotes that translate how much its foundation is laid in God as an element of discourse that guarantees what they reveal. In the "Objections and Answers" to his "Meditations" (published together, firstly in 1642), the philosopher writes about God's will and how it is because of His will that we are able to think: And finally, because we experience a certain power of thinking in ourselves, we easily conceive that such power may exist in someone else, even greater than in us; however, even if we think that it grows to infinity, we are not afraid that ours will become smaller. The same is true of all the other attributes of God, including the power to produce some effect outside himself, as long as we suppose that there is nothing in us without being subject to God's will; therefore, it is possible to understand it as totally infinite without any exclusion of created things ([19], p. 159).

Still in the same text, when writing about the human capacity to know, Descartes makes it depend directly on God, besides attributing to his products ("essences of things" and "mathematical truths"), the attributes of eternity and immutability: "(...) I do not really think that the essences of things and these mathematical truths that can be known are independent of God, but I do think, however, that, as God intended and disposed, they are unchanging and eternal" ([19], p. 197).

This reliance of modern science on the God it refuses is not just a written fact, dated and reduced to Descartes. Suffice it to say that all science after the father of Modernity, also including all Western pedagogy, from which the new generations are formed in the 21st century, is organized according to Cartesian formulations, remaining present in ontotheological and unifying scientific thought.

It is observed in the ideology that guides contemporary science as a background, the constant search for the concept that would take the soothing form of an absolutist thought. This is what a researcher does when faced with a boundary situation and not having an adequate response to it, and, in order not to have to deal with the anguish of not knowing, he appeals to an understanding and definitive idea or concept. Example: A mental health expert facing a patient inconvenient to the hospital routine would say to his staff members: "But we are not getting the treatment right because we are forgetting that he is psychotic; matter of structure!".

In seminars of the 1960s, in which he dialogued with psychiatrists and students at the invitation of L. Binswanger, Heidegger [13] observed that the modern sciences of mental health and illness attempt to apply to the man the same principles of objectification, calculability, legality and accuracy they use when studying nonhuman beings. The modern scientist, he said, is horrified at ambiguity and misconception, and supposes that it should be avoided by all science ([13], p. 166).

Objectivity depends on measurement, and measuring an object means acting to predict its natural behavior. Mastering it, since becoming a master and owner of nature is the project of Modern science: "nous rendres comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature" (make us masters and owners of nature) (Descartes, 1960, cited by Heidegger [13], p. 131). Such a possession requires a method in which objects are placed beforehand (third of the "Rules for the Direction of the Spirit").

The truth of things sought by science, which Descartes mentions in the fourth rule, is not the truth of the thing itself. It is an objectified truth, clear and undoubted to the self that makes the representation of objects put beforehand. It is not the truth as "thingness, present in itself," since the fundamental certainty is in the thinking consciousness. The "object has been placed beforehand" by the thinking consciousness and for it itself. Thus, the objectivity of nature, Heidegger reflects in the July 8, 1965 class, is determined by the subject's knowability, that is, "objectivity is determined by subjectivity" ([13], p. 134).

On the other hand, the idea of scientific objectivity is part of a maneuver started with Galilei and it is solely for the purpose of making nature useful, available to man, calculable for control purposes. This is because Galileo Galilei's maneuver consisted of making physical space homogeneous, so that the motion rules could be the same wherever calculus was applied. "For Galilei, above, below, left and right are eliminated (...) Nature is seen in a determined manner to correspond to the conditions of measurability" ([13], p. 47). Heidegger then asks if the physical space would ever be homogeneous.

The science of man which he only suggests in 1965 must be rigorous, but it need not be exact, since "all science is strictly bound to its field, but not all rigor is accuracy in the sense of calculating" ([13], p. 222). Note that in a very close sense to this philosopher's statement, Lacan wrote twelve years earlier in the text "Function and field of speech and language": "The opposition that would be drawn between the exact sciences and those for which there is no reason to decline from the denomination of conjecture for lack of foundation for this opposition no longer seems acceptable. For accuracy is distinguished from truth and conjecture does not preclude rigor ([20], p. 287)".

Science or sciences?

It is believed to have shown that Heidegger's claims about the sciences authorize thinking of them, as he does, in the plural rather than in the form of a single term.

The use of the expression "science", so common in academic as well as extra-academic circles, is due to the hegemony of a certain way of practicing it. It is the contemporary translation of the ontotheologization of thought and theologization of modern science highlighted by Heidegger. The phrase indicates the dominance of the modern idea of science that translates most strongly into the practices of physics, biology, and others that use or research together. These are sciences whose priority methods are the hypothetical-deductive approach method (largely developed by the Anglo-Saxon tradition and advocated by Karl Popper) and the method of logical-experimental procedures.

Heidegger's well-grounded criticism of modern science conceptions, procedures, and history, as well as his view that there is no universal science but particular science ([21], p. 227), is an opening to propose that the debate about them should not be restricted to the vision and discourse of the single concept.

For example, for Marconi and Lakatos [22] the sciences are many and can be formal or factual. The former study the ideas and do not use contact with sensitive reality, so they do not need laboratory or field experimentation. Their statements are based on abstract entities and the relationships studied are between symbols. They formalize what the factual sciences handle in their research. They are formal sciences, logic and mathematics. Those of the second (factual) group draw on the ideas and elaborations practiced by the former to carry out their research in contact with sensitive reality through controlled or free experimentation. In principle, in such cases, experience is the guarantor of the discovered truths. Factual sciences are classified into natural (physics, chemistry, and biology) and social (anthropology, law, economics, politics, sociology, and psychology).

Is it necessary to go back in time to propose other ways of doing science other than the naturalistic Modern form? It is believed it is not. We can start from where we are and from experience with what we look at. However, it is recognized that it is necessary for each of the sciences to demonstrate the reason and intelligibility of what it does in its practice.

Is psychoanalysis a science?

Heidegger was a phenomenologist and there is no indication that he was in favor of psychoanalysis. But his observation, seen above, that not all rigor is accuracy in the sense of calculating, and that all science is strictly linked to its field, opens up a perspective: It allows thinking the scientificity of every procedure that has the attribute of rigor and which performs it by linking its ideas (its theory) point by point to the field of its performance. Psychoanalysis will be included there.

Still in the years of 1928 and 1929, in a course of introduction to philosophy in Freiburg, the philosopher endeavored to characterize the scientific procedure from which his conclusions will be drawn and from which it will be analyzed whether the highlighted characteristics would also be present in the psychoanalysis.

First feature: practicing science means investigating. "Science only exists amid the passion of asking, amid the enthusiasm of discovery, amid the inexorability of critical accountability, demonstration, and grounding ([21], p. 15)". It can be said that in psychoanalysis the patient is asked about his symptoms because there is a desire to arrive at the truth of his symptom[3]. For this, we are critical with our own selves (we do or will have done our personal analysis) and seek to base ourselves on the authors we elect (Freud inevitably, and Lacan or Klein or Bion or Laplanche or others - according to the theoretical orientation each one chooses). In addition, outside the office, many practitioners of psychoanalysis (the citizen-analyst) ask and research about social issues: the psychological suffering treated in collective contexts, the criminality, the psyche of the juvenile offenders, the subjectivities in the medical-hospital practices, the fictional literature and its impacts, etc.

Second feature: the sciences are practical and they depend on more or less sophisticated technical apparatus (books are also a technical apparatus, says the philosopher). Psychoanalysis also has its surprisingly simple "technical apparatus": the office, the couch, the analyst's chair, and his books.

Third, the sciences are connections of true propositions. They are guided by utterances, propositions and concepts determined together. The connection of propositions is determined by the fact that they are mutually grounded. As Husserl attests, Heidegger says, if there is a unity of the grounding connection of true propositions, the question is the very basic concept of truth itself, as a propositional truth.

In psychoanalysis, a work is carried out with connections of theoretical propositions (extracted from clinical practices) and with the propositions coming from the analysand itself, which are elaborated by the analyst-analysand pair. On both sides, the connections of propositions are investigated for the same basic concept of truth. Truths are sought in reporting symptoms that patients complain about[4]. According to the philosopher's observation, if there is an ambiguity that governs the predicate-subject relation of every proposition, to paraphrase it, it can be said that such ambiguity disguises the polysemic richness of every propositional structure: "Since the propositional structure is richer, the starting point of this conformation is plurisignificant" ([21], p. 67). In an analysis, in order to find some truth with the patient, it is often necessary to scan the propositions he brings, so that he may be amazed at the connections he makes and through which he gets disoriented in the world, or to find true and forgotten syntagmatic connections, and to create new connections that enliven him.

Fourth feature deduced by Heidegger: The sciences establish a kind of truth, but while the sciences transform pre-scientific truths, the truths that the sciences themselves produce are neither the only possible nor better than others. The psychoanalyst knows that the truths

[3]Based on Lacan [23], it is said that the symptom is the way each unconsciously fills his life, his unique way of living, his own desire, and his enjoyment.

[4]And here we refer to another philosopher, Alain Badiou [24], for whom, in our days, the world was organized in such a way that any mode of consideration of the truth was overlooked if it did not serve the democratic materialism in any way. Contrary to the ideology that seems to convince us that there are but different bodies and languages, we will say along with the philosopher that there are truths as an exception. Truths make exception to bodies and languages.

discovered throughout a patient's process are not the only possible ones and are not better than other truths brought about by analytical work. In other words, every element brought to the analysis, whatever the patient's experiential field (family, professional, political, religious, artistic, etc.), is an element capable of revealing truths through psychoanalysis, but it should not be reduced to psychoanalytic theory.

Fifth: Every scientific procedure is an interpretation. "The essence of a scientific experiment is not observation, but interpretation of what has been observed, what is happening here ([21], p. 202)". It is obvious to say to psi practitioners (but not so obvious to other audiences) that psychoanalytic interpretation is a "key instrument" of what happens in the office, that is, it is fundamental for the treatment of symptoms, which (paraphrasing poet Drummond) are like a crooked angel of those who live in the shadows trying to fulfill a hidden desire.

The sixth characteristic of science proposed by Heidegger is that all science must self-limit or it will lose its authenticity if it does not. In psychoanalysis the position of listening and intervening on the desire and enjoyment of the subject is clear, and only this. If a patient in treatment says she cures her loneliness in the rapture experience she has when she repeatedly watches a movie in which she feels lifted into the arms of the actor who plays a hero ("I travel! I really dive into that and feel my whole body shaking with desire and pleasure"), or if another tells us that he has resorted to all kinds of religion to improve his phobic symptoms, we will limit our listening to what "home-cinema" and "religion" devices bring about from the subjects. More important than the religion consulted and the folk art device used is the way those subjects unconsciously attached themselves to such devices and what the elements involved there meant to them as analysands. To what do the men/women in that woman's love story refer to the image of the actor who plays the hero? What is the function, for that man, in his economy, his dynamics and his psychic topic, of the evangelical pastor and the Catholic priest to whom he went to ask for advice? No experience or elaborations that the patient makes of his experiences with other elements of his existence is undervalued. If he brought them into the analysis, there will be something to work on, for, when present, the matter is subject to some elaboration concerning the "functioning" of his psychic apparatus.

Seventh characteristic: Scientific knowledge is knowledge of the entity, not the being. It is knowledge of only one realm of the entity, not of its totality. This feature requires a little more care in its transposition into the reality of psychoanalysis, since Lacan prefers to work with what he calls the Real, and not with the being of philosophy. But still, it could be said that in an analytical healing process it is always and specifically the way he seeks us and which we serve today. This subject is affiliated with a name and a history of his own and sustains a singularity that he does not know (we do not know) and that moves him: his symptom. To say that psychoanalysis is the science of the singular is to say that an absolutely unpublished truth (truth about the symptom) emerges and comes into existence.

Finally, and considering the eighth characteristic proposed by Heidegger, according to which the unveiling practiced by a science goes hand in hand with the veiling (in the sense of veiling the being), it will be argued that in producing some truth an analysis has neither the pretense nor the illusion that this truth would cease to be locally situated, even if at that moment it presented itself as eternal and unchanging. There will always be the possibility for patients to (re) update their truth, as throughout their life new situations may (re) present for them different puzzles about their ways of being. In this sense, the statement of another philosopher, Alain Badiou [25] is summoned when he writes that an analysis is endless because the subject group, the singular group that arises in an analysis, is an infinite group. Interpreting Badiou and Heidegger (and it is only an interpretation), it will then be said that an analysis supports the local, therefore finite, presentation of a truth which, by definition, is infinite. In this context, "Local" does not have the meaning of a substance. but the sense of being a half-told truth, or impossible to tell in its entirety, since the maximum truth that can be said is what, from speech, presents itself as something impossible to say, or which carries within itself something impossible to say, too much to say.

To end this discussion of the scientificity of psychoanalysis, one might now ask why psychoanalysis causes such strangeness in the scientific milieu when it does not loath and hate. Perhaps one might argue that the answer to this question lies in its scientific intelligi-

bility, quite different from that of other sciences, especially those called modern natural sciences. The latter, regarding the practice with subjects suffering from psychic suffering, currently derive to the field of neurosciences, using primarily the hypothetical-deductive and logical-experimental methods [26].

Conclusion

When it comes to psychoanalysis, it is proposed that it is a non-ontotheological, non-absolutist science that recognizes in the subject something that would not be reduced even to its animal infrastructure or, to what some would consider it, as language games. Can the intelligibility of psychoanalysis be translated into some mathematical logical formalism that better spells out its rigor and guarantees it the recognition of its scientificity, as St. Freud wished? It will be searched in this direction.

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